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Abstract 
The principal findings of this study are that Great Britain's search for an 
independent nuclear deterrent was waged with a purposeful dedication that 
wedded highly effective statecraft and brilliant, innovative nuclear engineering 
to produce a strategic nuclear deterrent that remained under her sovereign 
control. Because Britain's efforts in this area were so often achieved in the face 
of United States' opposition, Britain's subsequent utilization of her deterrent 
capability as an instrument to secure American support, notwithstanding that 
opposition, ought to be considered an example of successful policy manage­
ment. The product of this effort has been the Anglo-American "special relation­
ship" in nuclear weapons. The demonstrable success of British policy 
management to nurture and secure the special relationship in nuclear weapons 
is confirmed by its endurance in the face of American indifference, if not overt 
hostility, to its continuation. A major contention of this inquiry, therefore, is 
that the independent nature of Britain's strategic nuclear deterrent has been the 
primary prerequisite for the evolution of an interdependent, hence "special," 
relationship with the United States. This relationship will endure, for it must; 
the physics and metaphysics of strategic relationships in the thermonuclear age 
will secure this constancy. In the meantime, Britain will play a far greater role 
internationally than heretofore, just as the special relationship binds her ever 
closer to the United States. And this, after all, has always been a principal 
objective of British policy. 
Preface 
The Cold War is over. In its wake, a new world order has emerged. The 
specter of Soviet communism threatening the West has vanished with the 
collapse of Soviet power. Seeking an explanation for that collapse, the distin­
guished strategic thinker, Sir Michael Howard, observed: 
All the conventional wisdom patiently garnered and winnowed over the past forty 
years, all those hundreds of books and scores of thousands of articles about 
East-West confrontation churned out by international-relations and strategic­
studies communities, suddenly seem about as relevant to our present concerns as 
the lore of medieval alchemists. Where now shall wisdom be foundi 
Where indeed? With the smashing of the Cold War paradigm, an even more 
decisive question emerges: How was atomic, and later thermonuclear, policy 
qua policy managed during the Cold War? 
Credit for the defeat of the Soviet Union has been justifiably attributed to the 
United States policy of strategic encirclement by means of naval, air, and 
land-based nuclear weapons. However, what is not so clear or so public is the 
collateral role played by Great Britain in the containment-hence deterrence­
and fmal denouement of the Soviet Union. As a thermonuclear power in her 
own right, Britain can project her power globally and impact thereby the central 
geostrategic balance of power. 
Britain's nuclear capability has been overshadowed by the numerical 
predominance of the American and Soviet arsenals and, in particular, by the 
configurational diversity of American weapon systems. Consequently, with a 
few notable exceptions, Britain's nuclear capability has been marginalized by 
scholars and other commentators.2 Thus, "the search for the origins of Soviet­
American antagonism has tended to push the role of the third of the Big Three 
to the margins."3 This focus, however, has been misdirected, for Great Britain 
has been remarkably successful in achieving her political objectives vis-i-vis 
the Soviet Union-and the United States. The source of this success lies in 
Britain's development of a credible independent nuclear deterrent and the 
concomitant policy to manage it. Britain has skillfully placed her nuclear 
strategy at the service of national policy and has realized very great results for 
her efforts. In so doing, Britain has proven herself an apt student of Bismarck. 
With the smashing of the prevailing Cold War paradigm, therefore, the time 
has come to rethink Britain's postwar role and perhaps discard old images and 
prejudices, since "there is a general acceptance within the literature published 
since the opening of the archives that British foreign and defense policy was 
much more important during the formative Cold War years than had tradition­
ally been recognized .... We need. therefore, to inquire into the British approach 
to nuclear deterrence to discover its source and substance. In this connection, 
we need to treat the modalities adopted by British policymakers for the 
management of the United Kingdom's nuclear deterrent and, ultimately, iden­
tify those politico-strategic objectives Britain sought and seeks to gain by virtue 
of her possession of such awesome weapons. In her pursuit of those objectives, 
Britain's deterrence doctrine developed around the following core themes: 
• A commitment to First Principles. These are the transhistorical prin­
ciples bequeathed to Britain by the geopolitical-geostrategic reality of her 
island-nation location as well as those of her greatest statesmen-principles to 
which Britain has shown fidelity over the centuries. 
• Independent Standing in Nuclear Weapons. The development and 
deployment of nuclear weapons under the sovereign control of the United 
Kingdom. That is to say, Britain has been single-minded in her devotion to the 
possession of a nuclear deterrent that is under the operational guidance of a 
single, sovereign key-a British key. 
• The Questionable Reliability of the United States. The British have 
questioned the reliability of the United States to apply its nuclear weapons in 
defense of vital British interests-or, alternatively, to risk destruction of 
American cities in a nuclear crisis, notwithstanding the NATO alliance. The 
American nuclear '"umbrella. "the British might argue, offers Europe protection 
in fair weather only and will not open for them when and if the "storm" comes. 
• Maintenance of an Assured Destroction Capability. The British have 
developed the nuclear capability to inflict unacceptable damage on any adver­
sary. This capacity seems to underpin all the above assumptions. 
• New Directions for DeteJTence: Development of • Substrateaic Role 
for Strategic Systems. As Great Britain enters a new world order, she is 
adapting her most advanced strategic deterrent-the Trident n ballistic missile 
nuclear submarine (SSBN)-to meet the challenge of substrategic threats posed 
by such rogue powers as Saddam Hussein's Iraq, Iran, or North Korea, among 
others. 
The evolution of Britain 's nuclear deterrence doctrine is, therefore, the initial 
focus of this paper. In section n. attention is given to examining how Britain 
forged the instruments of deterrence. This inquiry treats the use of secrecy as 
strategy and, following what I have tenned the Thucydidean paradigm, 
Britain's pursuit of dissimulation as statecraft. As section n examines policy 
management, Britain's seizure of the opportunity to exploit her possession of 
nuclear weapons for explicit political-strategic advantage is also explored. 
viii 
Here, Britain's utilization of the power inherent in an independent nuclear 
deterrent, instrumentally, to exert control over United States strategic policy 
was an example of successful policy management and statecraft. 
Having treated deterrence doctrine, the modalities of policy, and policy 
management, attention is then devoted to Britain's deterrence systems and their 
generational development, from the V-Bombers to the strategic nuclear sub­
marines, Polaris and Trident. Of some importance in this evolution was the 
extensive British effort to develop a redesigned warhead for the Polaris missile. 
Chevaline was the fruit of that effort, providing an extended life span for 
Britain's aging Polaris fleet in the 1980s and early 19905. 
This paper concludes with an assessment of the future of British nuclear 
deterrence in terms of Britain's objectives as she attempts to shape and in turn 
be shaped by the new world order upon which the international system is 
entering, now that the Cold War is over. Here, the enduring nature of the 
Anglo-American special relationship, as it has applied to nuclear weapons, is 
examined. A basic premise and theme of this study is that the enduring nature 
of this special relationship, in the face of American ambivalence, and even 
opposition, is testimony to the triumph of British policy management, statecraft, 
and ingenuity in weapons engineering. A proper understanding of this highly 
complex and yet public relationship will provide some insight into what I have 
tenned the "Physics and Metaphysics of Deterrence." 
ix 
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The Evolution of a Doctrine 
First Principles 
THE BRITISH NUCLEAR DETERRENT EVOLVED out of a commitment 
to first principles, followed by single-minded devotion to policy execu­
tion. In this connection, we are reminded that "Great Britain is one of the few 
powers of the modem age which has developed viable defense plans against 
unspecified antagonists . ...s That is to say, "her insular situation has permitted 
planning not against individual foes, but against functional threats: To maritime 
supremacy, to the Mediterranean-Middle East, to British home security . ..6 In 
so doing, Britain faithfully adhered to first principles, which have governed her 
foreign policy for several centuries. 
It fell to Winston Churchill to articulate those principles, in unusually explicit 
fashion. Speaking privately to the Conservative Members Committee on 
Foreign Affairs at the end of March 1936, Churchill advised: 
For four hoodred years the foreign policy of England has been to oppose the 
strongest, most aggressive, most dominating Power on the Continent, and par­
ticularly to prevent the Low Coootries falling into the hands of such a Power. 
Viewed in the light of history, these four centuries of consistent purpose amid so 
many changes of names and facts, of circumstances and conditions, must rank 
as one of the most remarkable episodes which the records of any race, nation, 
state, or people can show. Moreover, on all occasions England took the more 
difficult course . . . joined with the less strong Powers, made a combination 
among them, and thus defeated and frustrated the Continental military tyrant 
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whoever he was, whatever nation he led . .. Here is the wonderful unconscious 
tradition of British foreign policy. All our thoughts rest in that tradition today. I 
know of nothing which has occurred to alter or weaken the justice, wisdom, valor, 
and prudence upon which our ancestors acted. I know of nothing that has 
happened to human nature which in the slightest degree alters the validity of their 
conclusions. I know of nothing in military, political, economic, or scientific fact 
which makes me feel that we might not, or cannot, march along the same road. 
I venture to put this very general proposition before you because it seems to me 
that if it is accepted, everything else becomes much more simple. 
Observe that the policy of England takes no account of which nation it is that 
seeks the overlordship of Europe. The question is not whether it is Spain, or the 
French Monarchy, or the French Empire, or the German Empire, or the Hitler 
regime. It has nothing to do with rulers or nations; it is concerned solely with 
whoever is the strongest or the potentially dominating tyrant .... It is a law of 
public policy which we are following, and not a mere expedient dictated by 
accidental circumstances, or likes and dislikes, or any other sentiment. 7 
The general principle defining British foreign policy therefore explains why, 
with respect to the development of an atomic weapon, .. the original decisions 
were unrelated to any specific foreign enemy. The bomb was wanted not to 
defeat an opponent but for a series of unspecified future contingencies ... 8 In that 
sense, then, Britain became .. the first nation to develop the [nuclear] weapon 
as a long-range strategic asset, unrelated to dangers posed by the overt hostility 
of a specific opponent. .. 9 
"Britain had been the midwife of this bomb. H it had not been for the brilliant 
scientific work done in Britain in the early part of the war, by refugee scientists 
from Europe and by British scientists, the Second World War would almost 
certainly have ended before an atomic bomb was dropped. It had been the 
cogency and clarity of the British Maud Report in 194 1 which had persuaded 
the Americans of the practical possibility of an atomic bomb and the urgency 
of making one ... 10 Later, after American entry into the war, there was close 
collaboration with Britain on the development of an atomic bomb. For her part, 
in line with the fll'St principle of foreign policy alluded to above, Great Britain 
was determined to produce her own atomic bombs after the war was over. 
Clear evidence on this point exists. Sir James Chadwick, Britain's greatest 
living nuclear physicist, informed General Leslie Groves, Director of the 
Manhattan Project "during the war that Britain would go in for large-scale 
atomic production after the war ... 11 Also, in her official history of the United 
Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA), Margaret Gowing provides 
2 
Greenberg 
rather explicit testimony on the cosmic power which this ftrst principle held for 
British decision makers as the war ended. She writes: 
The British decision to make an atomic bomb had "emerged" from a body of 
general assumptions. It had not been a response to an immediate military threat 
but rather something fundamentalist and almost instinctive-a feeling that 
Britain must possess so climacteric a weapon in order to deter an atomically 
armed enemy, a feeling that Britain as a great power must acquire all major new 
weapons, a feeling that atomic weapons were a manifestation of the scientific 
and technological superiority on which Britain's strength, so deficient if 
measured in sheer number of men, must depend. A bomb would not be ready in 
any case for five years, so that the decision was of the variety that was impossible 
not to take rather than of the type that must be taken for urgent and immediate 12 
purposes. 
British nuclear deterrence doctrine, then, had emerged out of a core ftrst 
principle: the assumption that in a world of sovereign nation-states competing 
for advantage-and notwithstanding prevailing alliances-there were, to 
paraphrase Lord Palmerston, no permanent friends and no permanent enemies, 
only permanent interests. 
lndependent Strnding 
Britain's determination to preserve the independent nature of her strategic 
deterrent was thus rooted in ftrst principles and was calculated to free her from 
dependence on external sources. These factors, rather than any political dif­
ferences with the United States over the sharing of nuclear weapons technology, 
appear to have been decisive factors in the decision to seek an independent 
atomic deterrent for Britain. In any event, the British decision to begin develop­
ment of an atomic bomb "had not been taken as a result of the breakdown in 
1946 of Anglo-American atomic cooperation. The decision to produce ftssile 
material in the United Kingdom had been taken before this breakdown and was 
regarded as non-negotiable in any circumstances."13 What drove the policy, 
rather, was the fundamental consideration that in a world of sovereign nation­
states, Anglo-American interests were not necessarily identical, not necessarily 
paraUel, not necessarily convergent. Therefore, with respect to Britain's quest 
for an independent nuclear deterrent, "some elements of British policy have 
carried the suppressed premise that there might develop a divergence of 
strategic interest between America and Britain. In fact, this might be called the 
premise behind the whole of the British advanced-weapons programme, from 
3 
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Attlee's ftrst decision to build atomic bombs ... 14 Speaking at a secret and 
specially convened Ministerial Committee of the Cabinet on 8 January 1947, 
Prime Minister Clement Attlee's Foreign Secretary. Ernest Bevin, "said it was 
important that Britain should press on with the study of all aspects of atomic 
energy. 'We could not afford to acquiesce in an American monopoly of this 
new development' .. IS 
Even at the height of the Cold War. reliance on the nuclear umbrella provided 
by the United States was not a popular concept within the Royal Air Force. Sir 
John Slessor. Chief of the Air Staff. again took up Bevin's theme in a 1954 DBC 
broadcast: "The bomber is the primary agent of air mastery. If we want to 
remain a first class power we cannot possibly leave to an ally. however staunch 
and loyal. the monopoly of the instrument of such decisive importance in these 
massive issues of war and peace." 16 Slessor's views were sanctioned by Arthur 
Henderson. a "respected former Secretary of State for Air." During one of the 
rare parliamentary debates on creation of the British strategic nuclear deter­
rent-the context was the debate over the Air Estimates for 1954-Henderson 
warned: "I do not think that we should put all our bombing eggs into the copious 
American basket .. 17 Henderson's socialist colleague. John Strachey. Opposi­
tion Spokesman on Defence. concurred, supporting the Churchill government's 
proposed policy as well as the delivery system for atomic bombs. The strategic 
bomber. he declared, was the contemporary equivalent of the Dreadnought 
battleship and consequently the "essential weapon for this island ... 1 8 A core 
concern during this period was that in the event of war Britain might have a 
different set of targeting priorities than the United States. As Prime Minister 
Sir Winston Churchill put it in a 1955 parliamentary debate: 
Unless we can make a contribution of our own ... we cannot be sure that in an 
emergency the resources of other powers would be planned exactly as we would 
wish, or that the targets which would threaten us most would be given what we 
consider the necessary priority in the ftrst few hours. These targets might be of 
such cardinal importance that it would really be a matter of life and death for 
us. 19 
Consequently. Bomber Command. "like SAC. developed its nuclear bomber 
capability separately from NATO force structure planning.,,20 Determined to 
play her role in NATO. Britain nevertheless retained for herself at the same time 
a nuclear deterrent capability outsitk the alliance and, in particular. independent 
of U.S. control. Churchill's focus on the necessity for an independent nuclear 
deterrent in such primordial terms proved to be a recurrent theme in British 
doctrinal justification. Prime Minister Harold Macmillan. for example, advised 
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the House of Commons in 1963 that Britain "'should be in a position to make 
[its] own decision without fear of nuclear blackmail' and, should the 'necessity 
arise. to make its independent decisions on issues vital to her life. ' ..... 21 That 
such concerns were contractually articulated and secured was revealed in the 
exchange of letters between Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and President 
Jimmy Carter. consummating the Trident submarine sale on 10 July 1980. Item 
number three of Thatcher's letter contained the relevant caveat: 
The successor to the Polaris force will be assigned to the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization.liJce the Polaris force; and except where the United Kingdom may 
decide that supreme national interests are at stab. the successor force will be 
used for the purpose of international defense of the Western alliance in all 
circumstances.22 
Mrs. Thatcher's single qualification., then. is not merely an escape clause for 
Britain's independent deterrent-it is its very raison d'itre. Nothing else in the 
way of deterrence would do. 
Nuclear independence thus satisfied Britain's need to define for herself the 
limits of strategic policy. The result of Britain's effort in this direction was the 
creation of a "second center of decision" in the Anglo-American strategic 
calculus.23 Denis Healey. a Labour Minister of Defence. discussed the political 
and strategic implications. situationally: "If you are inside the alliance you 
increase the deterrent to the other side enormously if there is more than one 
centre of decision for the fltSt use of nuclear weapons ... 24 It fell to a successor 
Minister of Defence. a Conservative. Fnncis Pym. to take Healey's doctrinal 
principle to its logical geostrategic conclusion. Speaking in a rare parliamentary 
debate on strategic deterrence doctrine on 24 January 1980. Pym warned the 
Soviets against overt threats to Great Britain. The consequences would be most 
unfortunate for the Soviet Union: 
The nuclear decision would be no less agonizing for the United Kingdom than 
for the United States but it would be a decision of a separate and independent 
power and a power whose survival in freedom might be more directly and closely 
threatened by aggression in Europe than that of the United States. 
That was where the fact of having to face two decision-makers instead of one 
was of such significance. Soviet leaders would have to assess that there was a 
greater chance of one of them using its nuclear capability than if there were a 
single decision-maker across the Atlantic. The risk to the Soviet Union would be 
inescapably higher and less calculable.25 
s 
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In that awful eventuality, Great Britain and the United States would not 
necessarily be working in tandem, but quite possibly as separate and inde­
pendent actors. Hence the game would become ever more complex for Soviet 
ruling elites, who would f11ld themselves at the mercy of a power calculus, 
horrifying in scope and dynamics. The threat posed by two allies acting in 
concert is merely arithmetical in nature; with separate and independent actors, 
operating apart, the threat posed relative to who might inflict what on whom, 
when, complicates the strategic calculus exponentially. Such is the concrete 
tribute paid to the inherent power of a strategic deterrent capable of operating 
against the Soviet Union on a basis independent of United States wishes or, if 
necessary, outside her control. 
Declarations by the then leader of the Labour Party, Michael Foot, to discard 
Britain's independent deterrent should Labour return to power, again allowed 
policy makers the opportunity to profess their commitment to its continuance, 
as the following 198 1 article from the London Times made clear: 
In the defense community there is a devotion to the idea of a British deterrent 
that goes deeper than mere reason would allow. It peeps through the lines in the 
dry language of White Papers and statements to Parliament and surfaces in 
private conversations. For example, when asked how the Ministry of Defence 
would respond to a Secretary of State who arrived with the intention of disman­
tling the deterrent, one experienced figure replied: "Every gun in the place would 
be turned on him ... 26 
The level of devotion drew the following wry observation from the journalist, 
Peter Hennessy: 
I remarked to a veteran of the deterrent business how dedicated they seemed to 
their task. He replied: "Oh yes, they are so fanatical about it that, if all else failed, 
they would strap the Polaris missile tubes to the royal yacht as a way of keeping 
the thing going ... %7 
This remark is highly evocative, if only because it taps primordial impulses. As 
Professor Lawrence Freedman observed in this connection, "The most com­
pelling strategic rationale for a British nuclear force ... has an appeal that is 
more primitive than intellectual, but is no less powerful for that ... 28 In just this 
manner, Britain has signalled her continued commitment to staying in the 
nuclear game as an actor with independent strategic capability, regardless of 
the attendant sacrifices. 
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The Reliability of the United States 
Aside from the independent standing that Britain sought, a secondary theme 
emerged to function as a prism through which British governments would view 
their nuclear relationship with the United States: the reliability of the United 
States in applying its atomic weapons in defense of Great Britain. The words 
of former Prime Minister Clement Attlee should be seen in this context. Attlee 
recalled in his memoirs: 
We had to hold up our �tion ru-a-ruthe Americanc;. We couldn't allow ourselves 
to be wholly in their han&;, and their �tion wasn't awfully clear always .... At 
that time, we had to bear in mind that there was always the possibility of their 
withdrawing and becoming isolationist once again. The manufacture of a British 
atom bomb was, therefore, at that stage essential to our defense .... At that time, 
although we were doing our best to make the Americans tmderstand the realities of 
the European situation-the world situation-we couldn't be sure we'd succeed. In 
the em, we did. But we oouldn't take risks with British security in the meantime. ... We 
had to face the world as it was. We had to look to our defense-and to our indumiaI 
future. We could not agree that only America should have atomic energy .,,29 
Subsequent events in the history of Anglo-American relations would supply the 
British with a series of "litmus tests" for American unreliability, notwithstand­
ing the constancy of relations within the Atlantic alliance: 
• The McMahon Act, 1946 
• The Suez Crisis, 1956 
• The Skybolt Missile Crisis and Nassau Conference, 1962-1963 
The non-delivery of Poseidon Missiles to Britain, 1967 
• The provision of a nuclear "umbrella" for the defense of Western Europe 
For Britain, these litmus tests would confmn that where Britain's most vital 
interests-as defmed by Britain-were concerned, United States commitments 
had a limited liability. That is to say, in the cases considered, the U.S. attitude 
would prove to be at the very least, problematical; at most, hostile. 
Litmus Test #1: The McMahon Act, 1946 
The United States first undercut British aspirations for cooperation in the 
development of nuclear weapons when, in June 1946, the Truman administra­
tion published the "Baruch Plan." The Baruch Plan called for international 
control over atomic energy, just when Great Britain was hoping that the U.S. 
would honor her wartime commitments to continue nuclear collaboration with 
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Britain in the postwar years. Such hopes were to be dashed in August, when 
President Truman signed the McMahon Act, which prohibited the transfering 
to any other nation the scientific and technological information necessary to 
manufacture an atomic bomb. The penalties for violating this law were 
draconian: death or life imprisonment 30 
For Britain, there could be no misinterpretation of the meaning of the 
McMahon Act. Both the substance of the Act itself and the political implica­
tions it raised signalled American intent insofar as postwar Anglo-American 
nuclear collaboration was concerned. President Harry Truman's 20 April 
1946 letter to Prime Minister Attlee was particularly unambiguous: 
As to our entering at this time into an arrangement to assist the United Kingdom 
in building an atomic energy plant, I think it would be exceedingly unwise from 
the standpoint of the United Kingdom as well as the United States .... 
I would not want to have it said that on the morning following the issuance of 
our declaration to bring about international control we entered into a new 
agreement, the purpose of which was to have the United States furnish the 
information as to construction and operation of plants which would enable the 
United Kingdom to construct another atomic energy plant.31 
Britain felt betrayed by the United States as a result of this legislation. While 
it is quite clear that Britain's decision to "go it alone" in the development of 
nuclear weapons was taken independent of the McMahon Act, there is no doubt 
that its enactment led Britain to the stark conclusion that earlier American 
promises in this sphere were unreliable.32 Senator McMahon's contention to 
British ministers that he would have supported looser language in the Act, had 
he only known about the intimacy of Anglo-American wartime collaboration, 
added insult to injury. Professor Gowing noted in this connection that "imme­
diately after the war" much infonnation on the wartime nuclear collaboration 
with Britain was in fact passed to Congress.33 
Overcoming feelings of political betrayal, the British nuned to developing and 
deploying an atomic bomb unilaterally. Some in the British government believed 
it was beyond Britain's capability to develop such a weapon without recourse to 
the vast American technological and industrial base. Others ridiculed this fear as 
unwarranted. To the doubters, Sir James Chadwick posed this challenge: 
"Are we so helpless ... that we can do nothing without the United States?" 
Christopher Hinton, the great engineer in charge of the industrial side of Britain· s 
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postwar project, took the same line. Indeed, he said that the McMahon Act was 
a blessing because it would make the British think for themselves.34 
Nevertheless, Britain's fear about American constancy remained: under 
what circumstances would America's atomic shield be activated for the 
defense of Great Britain? The way the British chose to address this question 
during the Cold War has revealed the doctrinal assumption that questions 
American reliability to act as Britain's nuclear shield. Thus, while British 
officials usually "refrain from hypotheses on the circumstances that might 
cause" the United States to withhold nuclear protection, on those occasions 
when they do become more explicit in their comments the underlying prin­
ciples behind an independent British deterrent are elaborated.3s 
In the late 1940s and early 1950s, while the United States enjoyed a 
nuclear monopoly, British strategic planners speculated on the future vul­
nerability of the American mainland to Soviet nuclear attack. Their con­
clusion had important implications for Britain's own efforts at securing 
nuclear independence. Their assumption was .. that, in future, Britain might 
not be able to rely on the U.S. nuclear threat against Soviet urban and 
industrial areas, which hitherto had been seen as the chief deterrent to Soviet 
adventurisms in Western Europe.,,36 This justified, in doctrinal and opera­
tional terms, an independent effort by Britain, as indicated in this evaluation 
by British analysts in July 1954: "Retaliation does not provide a global 
defense, it can only defend those places that are completely integrated 
politically. When New York is vulnerable to attack. the United States will 
not use her strategic weapon in defense of London. ,,37 
This scenario was played to its logical and most explicit conclusion in a 
March 1955 analysis by British defense officials. For the United Kingdom it 
was "strategically unacceptable to rely entirely on the United States to provide 
the deterrent. Moreover, with the rapidly increasing yield of nuclear weapons 
it would become progressively more difficult for the United States to come to 
our aid if we alone were threatened in view of the consequences to her of such 
action. ,,38 This scenario was to be subjected to the test of reality not long after, 
in the Suez Crisis of 1956. 
Litmus Test #2: The Suez Crisis, 1956 
The crisis at Suez represented the decisive moment in the postwar period 
when the two allies, Great Britain and the United States, allowed their 
heretofore discreet adversarial relationship over politics, economics, and 
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nuclear weapons-sharing to burst forth into the public domain over a question 
of colonialism and national self-interest. 39 America's humiliation of Britain and 
France for their intervention in Egypt. and a studied ambivalence in the face of 
explicit British requests for collective security guarantees under the NATO 
Treaty was, for Britain, a traumatic economic-politico-strategic experience. 
If the McMahon Act constituted the ftrst practical application of a litmus test 
for reliability, then. in British eyes, the U.S. had clearly failed to pass muster. 
The 1956 Suez Crisis provided a second such tesL Here again the United States 
was to fail. The U.S. had been the decisive factor in securing Britain's 1954 
agreement to negotiate a withdrawal from the Suez Canal Zone, a major British 
Middle Eastern base containing seventy thousand British troops. The Anglo­
Egyptian negotiations leading to the withdrawal agreement were often 
acrimonious, conducted amidst a guerrilla warfare campaign waged by Egypt 
against British occupation forces within the Suez Canal Zone. The U.S. earned 
British reproach for taking a decidedly pro-Egyptian position during the course 
of the negotiations. Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden vented his frustration at 
American behavior in 1954, declaring, "They want to replace us in 
Egypt .... they want to run the world . ..40 The die was cast when, in July 1956, 
Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal, a strategic artery 
for British commerce. 
The crisis itself erupted in an Anglo-French- Israeli invasion of the Suez 
Canal Zone in October- November 1956. The crisis so severely strained Anglo­
American relations that they appeared overtly hostile for a time. As the 
Anglo-French task force gathered in the Eastern Mediterranean for the planned 
invasion of Egypt. Vice-Admiral Sir Robin Dumford-Slater, Naval Task Force 
Commander, signalled on 31 October 1956: "[United States] Sixth Fleet are an 
embarrassment in my neighborhood . . . .  We have already twice intercepted 
U.S. aircraft and there is constant danger of an incident...41 On the morrow, 
Admiral Durnford-Slater reported to Sir Guy Grantham, Commander-in-Chief, 
Mediterranean, as follows: "Have been continually menaced during past eight 
hours by U.S. aircraft approaching low down as close as 4000 yards, and on 
two occasions flying over ships . ..42 The Americans indeed appeared to be trying 
to impede if not frustrate Anglo-French operations; the American government, 
after all, vigorously opposed the covert Anglo-French- Israeli collusion and 
subsequent attack on Egypt. Thus, for example, Vice-Admiral Sir Manley 
Power, Commander Allied Carrier Force, wrote in his official report: "I 
considered it quite possible .. . that they were obstructing us on purpose as their 
aircraft flying in the area rendered our air warning virtually useless . ..43 
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On the American side, grim determination prevailed. The orders of Admiral 
Arleigh Burke, Chief of Naval Operations, to the United States Sixth Fleet were 
"to keep in close touch with the British and French 'to make sure we knew 
where they were and what they were doing. ,..44 Admiral Burke recalled for the 
John Foster Dulles Oral History Project at Princeton University his instructions 
to Admiral Charles R. "Cat" Brown, Commander, U.S. Sixth Fleet: "to 'go to 
sea with his bombs up, ready to fight anything. ' 'Cat' Brown sent back: 'Who's 
the enemy?' and I sent back, 'Don't take any guff from anybody.'" When 
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles asked Admiral Burke "whether there was 
a way the Sixth Fleet could be used to stop the operation," Admiral Burke 
replied, "'Mr. Secretary, there is only one way to stop them. We can stop them, 
but we will blast hell out of them.' [Dulles then asked,] 'Well, can't you stop 
them some other way?' [Admiral Burke's reply was instructive:] I said, 'No, if 
we're going to threaten . . then you've got to be ready to shoot. ... We can 
defeat them-the British and the French and the Egyptians and the Israelis-the 
whole goddamn works of them we can knock off, if you want. But that's the 
only way to do it. ,..45 
When Admiral Brown was asked by the British whether he could reposition 
his fleet to move away from its position between Port Said and the Anglo­
French invasion armada, Admiral Brown replied that "he had taken up his 
position on direct orders from his Government...46 
The actions of the U.S. Navy in thwarting British-French plans to depose the 
Nasser regime by force were not, therefore, inconsiderable. Looking back on 
the Suez war, General Sir Charles Keightley, Commander-in-Chief, Anglo­
French forces, noted that: 
"It was the action of the u.s. which really defeated us in attaining our object'" 
The movements of the Sixth Fleet "endangered the whole of our relations with 
that country . • . .  ..47 
But as it turned out, American inaction at the strategic level was to prove even 
more decisive for Britain-in a negative sense-than had been the actions of 
the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. 
Perhaps the most decisive point in the crisis was reached on 5 November 
1956, when Marshal Nikolai A. Bulganin, premier of the Soviet Union, sent 
letters to Britain and France, warning them of the "dangerous consequences" 
of their "aggressive war in Egypt." The two allies had already bombed Egyptian 
airfields and were poised to invade the Suez Canal region. Ominously, the 
Soviet Union warned that London and Paris were already targeted by Soviet 
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rocket forces, and it concluded: "We are fully determined to crush the aggres­
sors ... through the use of force. We hope at this critical moment you will show 
prudence and draw corresponding conclusions from this . ..48 
In the face of such provocation, Britain determined to invoke her member­
ship in the NATO alliance by asking for U.S. support. As Terence Robertson 
has revealed, however: 
In Downing Street, at least, the facade of political steadiness was supported by 
the conviction that in the last analysis the United States would throw a protection 
umbrella of nuclear authority over its allies. WISely, however, both governments 
asked Washington to confirm that this would be the case. A brief message from 
the State Department, however, shattered the facade and let disintegration set in. 
'"The Government of the U.S.," said the message, "will respect its obligations 
under the North Atlantic Treaty arrangements . . . .  ..4!I 
The U.S. response was not satisfactory, as Robertson made clear: 
Official exchanges at times of crisis are seldom what they seem. Beneath 
harmless exteriors there are explosive intents hidden from all but the few 
statesmen who may be aware of the background of events and the contexts in 
which they are drafted. 30 
In fact, .. the message was deliberately designed to be interpreted in two 
ways: The U.S. guaranteed the security of Britain and France if they were 
attacked wherever Western interests were at stake; or the United States 
guarantee under NATO was valid only if there was an attack in Europe."Sl 
Seeking clarification of this ambivalence, Prime Minister Eden telephoned 
President Dwight Eisenhower but was not able to get through. Therefore, he 
"sent a personal message to the White House asking for immediate assurance 
that the United States would retaliate against the Soviet Union if Britain and 
France were attacked. While the long night of grand drama dragged on, the 
Prime Minister kept vigil at Downing Street, waiting for the reply that never 
came."S2 
At dawn, Anglo-French forces invaded Egypt. This was followed by a run 
on the pound sterling, instigated by the United States government itself, to force 
the invaders to cease fire and withdraw. They were forced to do so, and in 
humiliation. So wide and deep were the fissures in Anglo-American relations 
that even a generation later deep scars remained, as David Nunnerley has 
observed in his President Kennedy and Britain: 
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TIle consequent vibrations on America's alliances are even today [i.e., 1972] 
being felt and the full price of Dulles is still to be completely paid. Suez 
highlighted the great dangers of Britain's dependence upon American power. 
For, despite Macmillan's efforts to continue as if nothing had ever happened, the 
Anglo-American relationship has never been quite the same since Suez . . . .  53 
It is often said that history is written by the victors. In the case of Suez 1956, 
the fact is that in American academic and political conventional wisdom the 
Suez Crisis is but a mere historical footnote: Britain was defeated and could 
henceforth no longer play an independent role on the world scene as a great 
power actor.54 From the British perspective, however, Suez remains the 
decisive challenge of the postwar period, notwithstanding the deep divisions 
within British society over Eden's actions at the time, and notwithstanding the 
concurrence of much informed British opinion in the American view. 
The actual postmortem on Suez by British leaders, however, led to radically 
different conclusions. The key lesson British leaders took away from Suez was 
not-as is commonly held-that henceforth Britain could no longer act contrary 
to American wishes in the world arena. Rather, in the Suez aftermath Britain 
concluded that the U.S. had once again proven herself an unreliable ally when 
it came to the protection of those interests Britain considered to be of the fIrst 
magnitude. From the bitterness of their Suez experience, British leaders drew 
the lesson that henceforth challenges to the United States could never again be 
direct. That said, however, British leaders refused to surrender their sovereign 
right to take independent action in the future, should British interests be 
threatened again. In principle, after Suez the British determined that should their 
most vital interests again come under threat, they would act politically, 
diplomatically, and strategically to preclude being undercut or otherwise 
humiliated by the United States. The test would not come for a generation, but 
when it did, Britain's success in the Falklands War of 1982 fully vindicated the 
appreciation made by her leaders in the aftermath of the Suez debacle. In the 
Falklands, Britain secured full U.S. support for her position despite strong 
pressures within the Reagan administration for a more neutral policy, or an even 
more radical one which affIrmed the Monroe Doctrine and support for 
Argentina's seizure of Britain 's Falkland Islands.55 Britain would have neither. 
At the outset, she made clear to the U.S. that in this crisis she expected no less 
than complete support from her American ally. 
Britain's determination to preserve her control over access to the Strait of 
Magellan was demonstrated by the conduct of her naval action during the crisis. 
The insertion of a British nuclear attack submarine (SSN), HMS Conqueror, into 
the vicinity of the Strait of Magellan and the subsequent sinking of the 
13 
The Newport Papers 
Argentinean cruiser, General Belgrano, by HMS Conqueror were clear signals 
of that detennination. 
More ominously, Britain's alleged deployment of a Polaris ballistic missile­
carrying submarine (SSBN) to the South Atlantic, as far as Ascension Island, 
likewise revealed the length to which Britain was prepared to go to prevail over 
any obstacles to total victory, and her own political vindication. 56 
The situation was readily appreciated by Argentina's foreign minister, 
Nicanor de Costa Mendez. In an address (evocative of the Thucydidean Melian 
Dialogue,) to a specially convened meeting of the OAS foreign ministers, Costa 
Mendez accused the u.S. of "turning its back on the region in order to assist a 
European state, also Anglo-Saxon, also an atomic power, also a world power, 
in the prosecution of its criminal, aggressive colonialist adventure ... �7 Like the 
Melians of antiquity, Costa Mendez could only point to the injustice of the 
disparities of power between states and the concomitant lack of freedom of 
action accorded to pawns. Nevertheless, Costa Mendez accurately identified 
the source of Britain's success in the Falklands war and beyond: the possession 
of an independent thermonuclear capability, a currency with demonstrable 
deterrent value. That, along with an effective display of statecraft in Europe, 
within the British Commonwealth, and at the United Nations, secured for 
Britain full United States cooperation for the duration of the conflict. 
Indeed, the linkage between Suez 1956 and the Falklands War was made 
explicit and absolute by Julian Amery, a Conservative Member of Parliament. 
As a leading imperialist within the Tory Party, Amery had adamantly opposed 
the British agreement in 1954 to withdraw British forces from the Suez Canal 
Zone. His parliamentary faction, termed the "Suez Rebels" for their opposition 
to Britain's agreement to pull out of the Canal Zone, strongly supported Prime 
Minister Eden's Suez policy two year later. But once Britain was forced to 
capitulate before American pressure to cease military operations against Egypt 
and withdraw her forces, Amery in particular castigated his government. 
How different it was, one generation later, as Julian Amery basked in the 
warm glow of British victory in the Falklands, and with it, vindication. Amery 
shared his feelings in a BBC interview with Michael Charlton: 
After Suez there was a great streak of defeatism [which] entered into the hearts 
and minds of the British Civil Service establishment, which didn't enter into the 
gut feeling of the representatives of the British people in the House of Com­
mons . . • .  After the terribk psychological shock of our defeat-I wouldn 't use 
any other word-at Suer. it was an ekment of redemption.58 
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The lessons Britain learned at Suez were hard, but learned all the same. 
Applied in the Falklands War, they secured American support for Britain in a 
crisis where America conceivably might not otherwise have been so forthcom­
ing. Out of the bitterness of Suez, the Falklands conflict secured Britain concrete 
military, political, and strategic objectives. The Falklands was for Britain an 
example of superb policy management: Suez had been redeemed. 
Suez taught the British a second lesson. The course of events surrounding 
the Suez Crisis legitimized and fully vindicated the whole notion of an inde­
pendent nuclear deterrent Britain had already deployed some atomic weapons 
at the time of Suez. In the wake of Suez, Britain tested her first hydrogen bomb, 
in May 1957. This thermonuclear test confirmed explicitly British intentions in 
the nuclear weapons sphere. Any presumption that Britain's ambitions in this 
realm had been destroyed at Suez would now be fully discredited: the ther­
monuclear fallout from the bomb test remained as the existential evidence of 
Britain's continuing commitment to possess nuclear weapons that she herself 
controlled. 
In the wake of Suez, the new Macmillan government, which assumed power 
in January 1957, redirected British defense policy. Conventional forces were 
reduced, and renewed emphasis was placed on commando carrier operations, 
so necessary for the projection of conventional power overseas. With reference 
to the independent deterrent, recent research has concluded that what lay behind 
Britain's "new look" strategy carried out by the minister of defence, Duncan 
Sandys, was "above all . . .  motivated by notions of economy and prestige . ..59 
Martin Navias has completed a thorough study of Sandys' policies and con­
cluded that "it can be argued that throughout the period under study [i.e., 
1955- 1958], it appears that Sandy's [sic] primary concern was not strategy as 
much as economy.,,60 Sandys' main objective, in this view, was to reduce 
military manpower. Accordingly, "Sandys believed that defense was consum­
ing too great a proportion of the nation's wealth and that, as the struggle against 
the Soviet Union would be long and drawn out, only a healthy economy would 
be able to support a prolonged effort. Therefore solvency would have to be 
made the overriding goal. . . . ,,61 This thesis is rather overdrawn, for it ignores 
or downplays doctrinal presumptions pertaining to nuclear weapons and the 
necessity for an independent nuclear capability. 
A deeper reading of the evidence available would tend to conftrm that Sandys 
was far more committed to the nurturing of an independent deterrent than he 
was to balanced budgets. In the course of a parliamentary debate (April 1957), 
Sandys would reveal the strategic vision informing his policy: 
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So long as large American forces remain in Europe, and American bombers are 
based in Britain, it might be conceivably thought safe . . .  to leave to the United 
States the sole responsibility for providing the nuclear deterrent. But, when they 
have developed the S,OOO mile intercontinental ballistic: rocket, can we really be 
sure that every American Administration will go on looking at things in quite the 
same way?(Q. 
So dedicated, then, was Sandys to the preservation and enhancement of 
Britain's deterrent and to the notion as well of U.S. unreliability in the future 
that he was willing to scuttle Britain's conventional forces for the sake of 
building up this capability. The Vice Chief of the Royal Naval Staff, Sir William 
Davis, confirmed this assessment, noting that the minister of defence "did not 
have any strategical concept beyond the factor that in his opinion the atomic 
weapon was all important...63 
If this observation reflected an accurate assessment of Duncan Sandys' 
appreciation of the strategic imperative for Britain, then the lessons of Suez 
were drawn with great clarity: the deterrent must remain independent, and the 
reliability of the U.S. to defend Britain's vital interests outside NATO could no 
longer be taken for granted. 
The lessons of Suez 1956, therefore, had implications for the u.S. and the 
Soviet Union that would shape the strategic calculus for the next generation. 
Litmus Test '3: The Skybolt and the Nassau Conference, 1962-1963 
The Slcybolt Mi&sik Crisis. In the wake of the Suez Crisis, American 
reliability faced yet a third litmus test: the cancellation of an agreement to supply 
Britain with Skybolt missiles. Both crises were linked in the sense that Skybolt's 
"roots reach to the aftermath of Eden 's disappearance from the scene" following 
the Suez imbroglio.64 Skybolt was no minor crisis; "like the Suez debacle of 
1956, the crisis over Skybolt brought the Anglo-American alliance to its knees, 
producing as it did an almost complete breakdown in transatlantic communica­
tion . . . . ..65 
Since the Skybolt crisis and its subsequent resolution at Nassau capture the 
Anglo-American nuclear relationship in all its variegated dimensions, it is 
instructive to explore just how this affair raised the issue of American reliability 
in Britain.66 The focus of this inquiry, therefore, is on how British statesmen 
defined the issues involved and how, in turn, those issues were defmed by their 
American counterparts. 
The historical background was set at Camp David in March 1960. There 
President Eisenhower agreed to supply Prime Minister Macmillan with a new 
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weapon: Skybolt. Skybolt was not a bomb but a nuclear air-to-ground missile, 
a stand-off weapon that could penetrate Soviet airspace in relative safety. The 
United States had approved its development only the month before. 67 In return, 
the British government made bases on the west coast of Scotland available to 
the U.S. Navy for its Polaris missile submarines. Harold Macmillan observed 
in his memoirs that the Camp David Agreement established two ironclad 
principles: in the first instance, .. the arrangement about Skybolt was not merely 
a verbal understanding but a formal and binding agreement...68 Secondly, 
Macmillan insisted that he had secured President Eisenhower's "firm, although 
not legal," assurance that should Skybolt be proved a failed weapon system, 
"we would be able to obtain in substitution the essential elements of Polaris to 
be fitted to submarines of our own construction ... 69 
In the British view, the crisis over Skybolt arose when the United States 
violated the first principle and then refused to accede to the second, not­
withstanding British insistence on a moral-legal-political obligation on the part 
of the United States to honor both commitments. The crisis, therefore, was 
played out on the British side, against the backdrop of these two principles­
legality, and the honoring of a commitment made. Hence, the crisis was of a 
political and strategic nature, not a mere difference over technical flaws in the 
system. Consequently, the political context overshadowed any arguments by 
the Americans that Skybolt was not technically feasible or that its development 
costs were prohibitive. 
The opposition to Skybolt on "technical" grounds was nevertheless extensive 
and bitter. Muted warnings over Skybolt's feasibility began to seep out in the 
closing days of the Eisenhower administration. These were duly noted by Sir 
Solly Zuckerman, Chief Scientiftc Advisor to the British Ministry of Defence, 
and passed on to Harold Watkinson, the defence minister. Zuckerman recalled 
in this connection: 
My message was simple. It boiled down to the fact that, while the American 
Administration fully recognized that the project had assumed enonnous political 
importance in the UK, to President Eisenhower and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
Skybolt was no more than a very costly R&D program in which they had little 
faith.70 
In his fmal defense budget, President Eisenhower assured Britain that he stood 
behind the Camp David Agreement, while he reduced the allocation for Skybolt 
in his ftnal defense budget before leaving office?1 While still in the U.S. Senate, 
John F. Kennedy had sponsored a report on Skybolt .. that had been very 
discouraging ... 72 Upon his assumption of office, President Kennedy's defense 
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secretary, Robert McNamara, reconsidered Skybolt and came to view the 
project as "proven to be a pile of junk, for which we were paying the whole 
bill . . . :.73 
Skybolt"s cancellation was therefore inevitable and could have been 
legitimately attributable to technical liabilities if the United States had imme­
diately offered Britain a substitute system, in particular, Polaris. The fact that 
no such offer was made initially leads to the conclusion that Skybolt's cancel­
lation was made on other than purely technical or cost grounds-that is, on 
political grounds. 
The Skybolt dispute actually played against a backdrop of American opposi­
tion to national nuclear forces-independent nuclear deterrents. Since the 
Frenchforce dejrappe was in its infancy at the time, American opposition was 
focused mainly on Britain's deterrent force. The opposition issued from the 
very top of the Kennedy administration in the person of the president himself. 
President Kennedy's personal example would guide the actions of his advisors 
throughout the controversy. To his Special Assistant for National Security 
Mfairs, fellow Bostonian McGeorge Bundy, "Kennedy had privately dismissed 
Macmillan's cherished deterrent . . . as a 'political necessity but a piece of 
military foolishness . . . . , .. 74 
At a January 1962 White House luncheon given for Julian Amery, who was 
Prime Minister Macmillan's son-in-law and now Minister for Air, Kennedy 
offered his guest a guarded warning on Skybolt's efficacy. Bri� the president 
would advised his guest, should not place much faith in Skybolt becoming an 
operational reality. Amery took umbrage at this presidential prediction and 
heatedly replied that "Skybolt must be made to work. . . . The political conse­
quences on An�lo-American relations if Skybolt is canceled do not bear 
thinking about" S In this assessment, Amery was in full sync with the thinking 
of his father-in-law, the prime minister. Kennedy then sought to reassure 
Amery, and the crisis passed-for the moment 
Within the Kennedy administration, the focal point for opposition to national 
nuclear forces in general and to the Skybolt agreement in particular was 
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. Over at the State Department, George 
Ball, the Undersecretary, was perhaps the most articulate and outspoken op­
ponent of the Anglo-American "special relationship" in nuclear weapons, a 
relationship restored by President Eisenhower in 1958. Ball was joined in this 
outlook by Walt W. Rostow, then head of the prestigious Policy Planning Staff, 
and by Robert R. Bowie, a State Department counselor. 
Just several months after President Kennedy's warning to Julian Amery, the 
Skybolt issue began to move from a dispute over technical feasibility-an area 
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where honest differences could exist-to the politico-strategic. Speaking at a 
secret NATO Ministerial meeting in Athens, Greece, in early May 1962, 
Secretary McNamara attacked the whole notion of national nuclear forces. 
Macmillan's reaction to this speech underlined its political motives. Noted 
Macmillan, this "speech . . .  although nominally 'secret' soon began to 
leak. ... 76 The leak, however, would not be stanched, for Secretary McNamara 
then went public. In a now famous address attacking independent nuclear 
forces, at Ann Arbor, Michigan, on 16 June 1962, McNamara insisted that 
"limited nuclear capabilities, operating independently, are dangerous, expen­
sive, prone to obsolescence and lacking in credibility as a deterrent. ... 77 
McNamara's tone was not only self-assured but strident, as he ridiculed the 
concept of an independent nuclear deterrent composed of "relatively weak 
national nuclear forces with enemy cities as their targets [as] not likely to 
perfonn even the function of deterrence .... 78 Macmillan was outraged. He did 
not misinterpret McNamara's meaning or nuance, for there was nothing subtle 
about it. In delivering this speech, wrote Macmillan, McNamara "could hardly 
have done anything more calculated to upset both his French and his British 
allies. He put forward with equal vigour and clumsiness a powerful condemna­
tion of all national nuclear forces, except, of course, those of the United 
States .... 79 
Prime Minister Macmillan rejected McNamara's position and defmed Great 
Britain's policy for President de Gaulle: 
Britain already had a considerable nuclear force, and we were detennined to 
preserve this as "independent" in the sense that ultimate control would be under 
a British Government. I felt that this force was important for Britain, just as a 
similar force would be for France. It was a symbol of independence and showed 
that we were not just satellites or clients of America.80 
McNamara's Ann Arbor speech therefore created a crisis of confidence once 
again between Britain and the United States. In his diary, Macmillan would 
confide: 
McNamara's foolish speech about nuclear arms has enraged the French and put 
us in a difficulty . . . .  It's rather sad, because the Americans (who are naive and 
inexperienced) are up against centuries of diplomatic skill and fmesse.81 
If George Ball's recollection is accurate, then it was only on 8 November 
1962 that Secretary McNamara explicitly warned the British Ambassador, Sir 
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David Onnsby-Gore, that Skybolt would be cancelled. Ball framed the decision 
in the context of American, and not British, strategic interests: 
Skybolt had become for us a marginal, not an essential part of our deterrent 
arsenal. Not so for the British, and herein lay the problem. for a point bad been 
reached where our requirements and those of Great Britain diverged. The Skybolt 
was for us an unneeded supplement to already adequate existing programs; for 
Great Britain, it was her only means to koep an independent nuclear capability.12 
National nuclear forces thus posed a serious dilemma for the Americans. In 
an address delivered to NATO parliamentarians in Paris on 16 November 1962, 
Ball proposed an American solution: introduction of "a genuine multilateral 
medium-range ballistic missile force. fully coordinated with the other relevant 
forces of NATO . . .  but he was far less enthusiastic about a purely British 
deterrent...83 U.s. policy therefore chose "multilatera1ism" as the antidote of 
choice against the dangerous notion of national nuclear forces. Skybolt was to 
be the instrumentality through which the American government chose to work 
to weaken, if not destroy. the institutionalization of national nuclear forces 
outside multilateral (i.e .• U.S.) control. 
Less than one month later. the tension in Anglo-American relations reached 
new heights in the wake of a speech delivered at the United States Military 
Academy at West Point by former Secretary of State Dean Acheson. Speaking 
on S December 1962. and with a candor that bordered on the brutal. Acheson 
sought to invalidate the singularity of the AnglO-American special relationship 
(including the nuclear weapons facet). by marginalizjng the British contribu­
tion: 
Great Britain has lost an empire and has not yeA found a role. The attempt to play 
a separate power role-that is. a role apart from Europe. a role based on a "special 
relationship" with the United States. a role based on being the head of a 
"Commonwealth .. which has no political structure. or unity. or strength and 
enjoys a fragile and precocious economic relationship by means of the Sterling 
area and preferences in the British market-this role is about played out.14 
Such an outburst from a highly respected American statesman must be 
juxtaposed with his reputation as an Anglophile in culture. manners. and dress. 
It should also be seen against the background of the recently concluded Cuban 
Missile Crisis in which Acheson had played a role as a roving ambassador. 
Acheson visited Macmillan in London in that capacity. Therefore. in making 
his remarks. Acheson should be considered a not-so-private citizen; indeed. the 
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venue for those remarks would also tend to give them an official tint Examined 
in this context. along with McNamara's Ann Arbor speech, Ball's NATO speech 
the previous month, and President Kennedy's own position, Dean Acheson's 
remarks at West Point provoked dismay, alann, and bitterness in the British 
government. especially for the Queen's First Minister. 
Macmillan was outraged, particularly at the publicity the speech generated. 
He observed in this connection that "no doubt [Acheson's] argument could have 
been made discreetly and without offense. "85 The depth of the offense may be 
judged from the assessment of it. made by Macmillan in a letter to his old 
colleague of the Second World War, Lord Chandos: 
I have only seen the various Press reports of this speech. If those are accurate, in 
so far as he appeared to denigrate the resolution and will of Britain and the British 
people, Mr. Acheson has fallen into an error which has been made by quite a lot 
of people in the course of the last four hundred years, including Philip of Spain, 
Louis XIV, Napoleon, the Kaiser and Hitler . . . . 16 
Macmillan's analogies were an indication not only of Britain's defInition of 
the situation but also his desperation at the prospect of being denied a proper 
nuclear deterrent to fIll the gap between the time the V -Bombers were phased 
out of service and the deployment of whatever second-generation deterrent was 
eventually chosen.87 Arraigning Britain's closest ally in the dock alongside her 
most treacherous historical adversaries was probably unfair if not absurd. 
However, Macmillan, like Churchill before him, was quick to place Great 
Britain's interest before sentimentality-and in the instant case, sentiment had 
already lost its luster. Always quick to assess a situation, Macmillan now 
explicitly defIned the Skybolt affair in political terms, as follows: 
In view of the implication of McNamara's speech in Michigan and again at a 
NATO meeting in Paris in December it was difficult to suppress the suspicion 
that the failure of Skybolt might be welcomed in some American quarters as a 
means of forcing Britain out of the nuclear club.88 
The Nassau Conference. The Skybolt missile crisis was ultimately resolved 
at a summit conference held at Nassau in Bermuda from 1 8  to 2 1 December 
1962. There President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan met and reached 
a settlement As he prepared to depart for Nassau, Macmillan conveyed in a 
diary entry the sense of grave crisis that was impending: "There will be a great 
row in both countries. And it means a great battle with President Kennedy next 
week."89 And to his ambassador in Washington, Macmillan sent instructions 
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on how the Nassau Conference was to be handled. Despite the fact that the 
conference had been planned many months earlier and an agenda prepared in 
advance, Macmillan now sought to focus exclusively on Skybolt. The gravity 
of his concern was conveyed in his instructions to Ambassador Onnsby-Gore: 
My difficulty is that if we cannot reach an agreement on a realistic means of 
maintaining the British independent deterrent, all the other questions may only 
justify perfunctory discussion, since an "agonizing reappraisal" of all our foreign 
and defense policy will be required . . . .  \10 
Just before his departure, Macmillan traveled to France, at Ramboui1let, 
where he held talks with President de Gaulle. Macmillan sought to impress upon 
de Gaulle Great Britain's determination to maintain her independent deterrent, 
warning: 
I would explain to the President that, if Skybolt broke down. I must have an 
adequate replacement from the United States, such as Polaris-otherwise Britain 
would have to develop her own system, whether submarine or aerial, in spite of 
the COSt.91 
Perhaps Macmillan wished his warning to be transmitted to the Kennedy 
administration via a "back channel" prior to the conference. Nevertheless, when 
the British delegation arrived at Nassau on 19 December 1962, they were "in a 
not very friendly mood; in fact . . .  they were 'the angriest' British delegation 
seen at any Anglo-American summit since the war ... 92 George Ball recalled the 
ambience: the band welcoming President Kennedy to the Bahamas greeted him 
with a rendition of "Oh, Don't Deceive me! .. 93 A lack of trust was defmitely 
palpable. 
Macmillan set the tone for the conference at the initial meeting of both 
delegations. There he recalled Britain's historic role in the development of the 
atomic bomb. That role, Macmillan reminded his listeners, was no secret: 
"European countries knew perfectly well that Britain had been first in the field 
and might be said, up to the end of the War, to have had an equal share in the 
equity with America ... 94 The prime minister then issued an explicit warning that 
the continued integrity of Anglo-American relations stood or fell on the issue 
of a British independent nuclear deterrent: 
If the difficulties arising from the development of Skybolt were used. or seemed 
to be used. as a method of forcing Britain out of an independent nuclear capacity, 
the results would be very serious indeed. It would be deeply resented both by 
those of our people who favored an independent nuclear capability and by those 
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who opposed it. It would offend the sense of national pride and would be resisted 
by every means in our power." 
Startled by Macmillan's tone, President Kennedy nevertheless "referred to 
the difficulty for America in letting us [i.e., the U.K.] change to Polaris . . .  that 
the change from Skybolt to Polaris was one of principle to which they were 
not even honorably committed. "96 Instead, Kennedy proposed that 
Britain share SO percent of any further development costs of Skybolt. Macmil­
lan now saw his opening and turned Kennedy's proposal into a test of American 
credibility and reliability: 
I observed that although the proposed British marriage with Skybolt was not 
exactly a shotgun wedding, the virginity of the lady must now be regarded as 
doubtful. We are being asked to spend hundreds of millions of dollars upon a 
weapon on which the President's own authorities are casting doubts, both 
publicly and privately.97 
Macmillan then hoisted Kennedy's strategy on its very own petard, the 
discrediting of Skybolt. Macmillan used previous American arguments against 
further development of Skybolt to press for Polaris as the only suitable replace­
ment to meet Britain's strategic requirements over the next generation. Wrote 
Macmillan: 
As the argument proceeded, the Americans found themselves in the difficulty 
that they were resting upon two conflicting arguments. On the one side they said 
Skybolt would fail; on the other, they said that it could be made to work but they 
did not need it because of the development of Polaris. They were prepared to sell 
it to us-on tenns. III 
Now that Kennedy had rendered Skybolt operationally dead, Macmillan 
would demand Polaris. If no agreement could be reached on Polaris, then the 
whole future of Anglo-American relations would be in question; "We have gone 
a long way in this nuclear business . . .  but if we cannot agree, let us not patch 
up a compromise. Let us agree to part as friends."99 But Macmillan left the 
President in no doubt about the future of the alliance should a Polaris agreement 
remain unfulfilled: 
"It is possible . . .  that my Government will fall on this issue . . . . If the United 
States fails to help Britain . . .  public opinion, fickle as it is, will inevitably 
become anti-American. " This  would lead, [Macmillan] argued, to the assumption 
of power of a more neutralist group from within either of the two major political 
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parties. Indeed Macmillan hinted that it was not inconceivable that his own party 
might acc:ept an anti-American platform in order to retain power. lOG 
President Kennedy was now thoroughly alarmed by the possibility of a 
political-diplomatic-strategic split with Britain. He moved to defuse the crisis 
with what appeared to be a compromise solution but which was actually a defeat 
for his strategy to eviscerate the special relationship in nuclear weapons with 
the United Kingdom. The compromise included the American demand that 
British forces be included in a NATO multilateral nuclear force. The single 
caveat of this was included in Paragraph 9 of the Statement on Nuclear Defence 
Systems, 2 1  December 1962: '"The Prime Minister made it clear that except 
where Her Majesty"s Government may decide that supreme national interests 
are at stake," British strategic nuclear forces would be available for the defense 
of the Western Alliance. 101 
For Harold Macmillan, the Nassau Conference was a great triumph of British 
statesmanship and policy management. Macmillan outlined in his diary what 
he had achieved at Nassau: 
Broadly, I have a� to make our present bomber force (or part of it) and our 
Polaris force (when it comes) a NATO force for general purposes. But I have 
reserved absolutely the right of H.M.G. to use it independently "for supreme 
national interest." 
These phrases will be argued and counter-argued. But they represent a genuine 
attempt (which Americans fmally accepted) to make 8 proper contribution to 
interdependent defense, while letaining the ultimate rights of a soveleign state. 
This accepts the facts of life as they ate. 102 
Macmillan"s efforts earned for him his Queen's grateful thanks. '"The Queen 
congratulated him for having demonstrated that Britain still counted for a great 
deal, and could hold her head high. Her Majesty was right. .. 103 Macmillan had 
secured for Britain extremely generous terms for the Polaris agreement. Her 
purchase of Polaris missiles from the United States would cost less than 2 
percent of her defense budget. 104 Macmillan refused Secretary McNamara"s 
demand that Britain contribute to the research and development costs of Polaris, 
agreeing only to "add five per cent to the retail cost" of the end-item. 105 For his 
stand on the matter, McNamara earned Macmillan"s censure as "very grasp­
ing ... 106 Indeed, Dennis Healey, a future minister of defence in a Labour 
government headed by Harold Wilson, supported Britain"s continuing role as 
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an independent nuclear power in part in reaction to an American detennination 
that it should be ended once and for all: 
rm bound to say that one factor which strengthened my support for keeping the 
things going was that McNamara, and some Americans, were so anxious we 
should get rid of il107 
The Nassau Conference ended on 2 1  December 1962. The next day, as it 
happen� Skybolt was successfully test-fired on the sixth attempt The an­
nouncement was made by Secretary McNamara, but it came only after British 
Defence Minister Peter Thomeycroft had returned to London from Nassau to 
announce Skybolt's failure as a weapon system. While Macmillan might have 
been expected to suffer only embarrassment from this indiscretion, Kennedy 
was beside himself with fury. 
For President Kennedy, the true lesson of Skybolt might have become 
apparent only then. For it was only then that Kennedy realized that the price for 
delivering Skybolt to Britain might actually have been cheaper for the United 
States in the long run than the settlement reached in Nassau. President Kennedy 
would observe to Theodore Sorenson, his White House Counsel, that "it might 
well be concluded that . . .  we had an obligation to provide an alternative" to 
Skybolt 108 It is perhaps of some significance that the President did not suggest 
Polaris as that alternative. The lesson the American government would learn 
from the Skybolt crisis was that by taking the stand it had, the United States 
was forced to settle for a policy outcome it did not desire and which all its efforts 
had been directed at defeating. But for the United States it was too late to go 
back: America would have to live with the consequences of Nassau. Great 
Britain now had her second-generation nuclear deterrent and enjoyed a con­
tinuing special relationship with the United States in affumation of that fact. 
Britain's "separate power role," contrary to Acheson's characterization, was 
still very much alive and would remain so in the future. 
For Great Britain, there remained a residue of ill will, notwithstanding her 
policy triumph. In the opinion of Britain's prime minister, in the aftermath of 
the crisis American reliability remained problematic. The Americans, he noted, 
"have handled things in such a way as to make many of us feel very suspi­
cious."I09 1n any event, the effects of the Skybolt Crisis "lesson" were to be 
lasting. 
Slcybolt Redux: The Poseidon Affair. The United States decision in the 
19608 to advance her submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) force into 
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the next generation once again posed a dilemma for Britain. This next genera­
tion, Poseidon, was a multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicle (MIRV). 
The product of advanced technology, Poseidon was designed to be a counter­
force weapon, one that could neutralize Soviet anti-ballistic missile (ABM) 
defenses by virtue of the independent targetability of each of its multiple 
warheads. 
In the wake of the U.S. announcement to deploy Poseidon, the dilemma 
facing British decision makers was this: should they opt for the new Poseidon 
and thus keep pace in qualitative terms, at least, with the U.S., or see the latter 
move ahead to a more advanced seaborne missile system just as Britain"s own 
first Polaris submarine, HMS �solution, was entering service? As it turned out, 
Britain never acquired Poseidon, and it would be almost a generation before 
she acquired access to a MIRV system in the Trident submarine agreement with 
the United States. Nevertheless, it should be noted, Britain"s refusal of Poseidon 
was, for the most part, involuntary. Despite Dr. Henry Kissinger"s November 
1979 BBC interview with Michael Charlton in which Kissinger recalled his own 
urging of Poseidon on the British while he was Secretary of State, another view 
holds that even though Kissinger at that time "did not refuse Britain Poseidon," 
neither "did he press it on them. Instead, he spoke at some length on the 
obstacles to this purchase. SALT, he explained, was the least of these. The 
anns-control negotiations were beginning to move into qualitative restraints on 
offensive arms, and the acquisition by Britain of the MIRVed Poseidon would 
cause some difficulties . . . .  The problem, he suggested, was more that Congress 
was in an awkward mood on this sort of issue and was likely to refuse to 
countenance the transfer of this particularly advanced piece of technology . .. 1 10 
Furthennore, it would appear that "from 1966 on a diminution of interest on 
the American side could be detected. Admiral Hyman Rickover, in charge of 
America"s sea-based deterrent, wanted to limit the infonnation exchanges" then 
prevailing between the U.S. and Britain. l l l  
H we are to accept this contention, then, for Britain. acceptance of Poseidon 
had never been a live option, regardless of her real wishes or interests in the 
matter. Rather, the withholding of Poseidon from Britain was an act of policy 
by the United States government, Kissinger"s "congressional" escape clause 
notwithstanding. 1 12 
Thus cut off, and recalling the covert atomic development program under 
Attlee, Britain at great expense secretly designed, developed, and deployed a 
replacement for the Polaris missile, the Chevaline. The Chevaline Program had 
as its objective a redesigned warhead for the Polaris missile. Chevaline"s 
development, announced in January 1980, reconfirmed Britain"s position as a 
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key player in the nuclear arena. The Financial 1imes Science Editor, David 
Fishlock, observed that Chevaline's development "has now brought Britain 
abreast of the latest u.s. developments in warheads for ballistic missiles." I 13 
This achievement was crucial for the strategic assets Britain was able to secure 
from the United States as a result. Lawrence Freedman has observed the 
dynamics of this process and concluded that: 
If Britain fell behind in nuclear research then its ability to enter into or sustain 
reciprocal, cooperative relationships with other nations would be impaired. This 
was relevant . . . to the continuation of the existing close ties with the United 
States . . . .  1 1" 
Thus Britain's special relationship in nuclear weapons with the United 
States may be viewed as a function of British technical expertise in the 
fabrication of strategic-caliber weaponry. That relationship could just as 
well be as reciprocal as one given to singularity. In this connection, Britain 
was invited to participate in the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative Program­
"Star Wars." The U.S. government in 1 985 gave assurances to the British on 
technology transfer of Star Wars research products. Both governments 
agreed on eighteen areas of technology "in which Britain is considered 
particularly well qualified" to participate in SOl research. Some of these are 
of interest, e.g., ballistic missile command, control, and communications 
(i.e., C3);  laser radar, vibrometry and imaging; sensors; interceptor research; 
radar research; countermeasures; laser, particle beam, and radio frequency 
lethality, vulnerability, and hardening. 1 15 
The British minister of defence at the time, Michael Heseltine, declared that 
while the missile system for the Trident was already developed (Britain would 
manufacture her own warheads), "in the case of the SOl program . . .  the U.S. 
came to Britain and asked if the British would participate." I 16 
This request was obviously based on Britain's demonstrated capability. 
Indeed, by 1 989 British Ministry of Defence scientists were convinced that 
"Britain could develop a Star Wars antiballistic missile defense system based 
on existing weapons which would be capable of protecting British nuclear 
bases" from attack. I 17 
Thus, the special relationship itself emerges as a functional component of 
British strategic deterrence doctrine. The paradox here, of course, was the fact 
that the reciprocity achieved in Star Wars was achieved out of the consequences 
resulting from the American denial of the Poseidon system to Britain in the first 
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place. The Poseidon affair was, in a sense, Skybolt redux, but with an even 
larger payoff for Britain: 
• Chevaline 
• Star Wars participation 
• Acquisition of the Trident System 
The fmal paradox was the utilization of Chevaline 's successful development 
as the chief strategic asset and bargaining counter in the British bid to acquire 
Trident, the most advanced seabome MIRV system yet produced by the United 
States. Unlike Britain in its prior experience with Poseidon, the U.S. was foR:ed 
by the capability inherent in Chevaline to heed Britain's call for access to the 
Trident IT ballistic missile system. l IS Nor could the Americans default on the 
promised delivery of Trident, as they had previously on Skybolt, or obfuscate, 
as with Poseidon. Past history was obviously very much on the minds of "senior 
Ministry of Defence sources," as reported in The TImes (London): 
The sources were adamant that if the U.S. decided to develop a new missile and 
no longer wanted to deploy Trident fi, .. that eventuality is covered by the 
agreement." The!, said: '"There is no question of the U.S. pulling the rug from 
under our feet. "I , 
It is just here that once again the question of American reliability was injected 
into the picture by British officials. The American decision to supply Britain with 
Trident, rather than allaying suspicions as might have been expected, only inten­
sified British "worries about the future re1iabi1ity of the United States as an ally ... 120 
Prime Minister Thatcher's caveat in the exchange of letters with President Carter 
of 10 July 1980, it will be recalled, was highly revealing, echoing as it did Harold 
Macmillan's Nassau declaration. Mrs. Thatcher declared that the Trident strategic 
missile would likewise be assigned to NATO, "except where the United Kingdom 
may decide that supreme national interests are at stake ... 121 In that situation, Britain 
might have to rely on its own devices without reference to the United States, or for 
that matter anyone else. President Kennedy's admission shortly after Nassau is 
therefore highly revealing in this connection: '"The British will have their deterrent. 
It will be independent in moments of great national peril, which is really the only 
time you consider using nuclear weapons anyway ... 122 So much for the NATO gloss 
placed on the Statement of Use by Prime Ministers Thatcher and Macmillan; their 
caveat told the tale. However, even the gloss was too much for John Nott, minister 
of defence in the Thatcher Government, as he discarded it in favor of a bold 




I'm not buying it [the Trident D-5] for NATO. In the last resort we must be able 
to stand alone. I'm greatly in favor of the Alliance, but you can never teU, and I 
can't be sure that the Alliance will be as healthy in 20 years' time as it is today. 123 
John Nott's feelings were shared by his Cabinet colleagues, as recalled by Peter 
Hennessy in The Times: 
The five ministers who sat on Mrs. Thatcher's Polaris replacement committee, 
MISC 7, are of an age where "standing alone" in 1940 was a personal and 
formative experience. 
Is not their devotion to the deterrent, and the feeling of those of a similar 
background in the defense community, an instructive wish for insurance against 
a rerun of the Battle of Britain summer? For clever "boffins" applying radar and 
breaking the Luftwaffe's codes one can read "eggheads" at Aldermaston and 
communications experts in bunkers beneath the Chilterns, and for brave young 
men in Spitfires substitute youthful commanders in submarines lurking beneath 
the North Atlantic, as aU that stands between a Britain bereft of allies and the 
enemy along the Channel ports. 
Whitehall would never resort to using the "national sovereignty" argument, unless 
it looked like losing the debate once and for aU, for fear of upsetting the United States. 
But it was WlCertainty about our allies in the future that lay behind the decision of 
MIse 7 on Trident as surely as it was the imperative guiding Mr. Attlee's Cabinet 
Committee when it decided to build the first British bomb in 1947.IU 
No wonder, then, that British leaders have been particularly worried about the 
reliability of the United States. During the Cold War, one area where American 
reliability was an issue of concern was that of nuclear reassurance for Britain and 
for Europe. This issue sparked British angst and a challenge to the United States. 
Even as the Cold War faded, American constancy was being tested ata substtategic 
level, with Western European nations demanding an American commitment to 
send troops to Bosnia, albeit in a peace-keeping capacity, not as an expeditionary 
force to wage war. Nevertheless, as the record attests, angst over the constancy of 
American commitment often became the occasion for revealing insights into 
British strategic doctrine and policy management 
Litmus Test 14: The Nuclear Umbrella for Europe 
In evidence submitted to the Parliamentary Expenditure Committee by the 
Ministry of Defence in 1975, the independent nuclear deterrent was justified as 
"an element of insurance, and reassurance to our European allies, against any 
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weakening of the United States nuclear guarantee ... I25 What was so striking 
about this assertion was the fact that just two years after fonnally joining the 
European Economic Community (EEC). Great Britain was explicitly asserting 
her intention to provide a nuclear umbrella for Western Europe should the 
United States ever suffer a loss of nerve or commitment. Here. then. the 
circumstances were clearly drawn: 
In the last resort, if the Alliance was to collapse. the possession of an independent 
strategic weapon provides the United Kingdom with the means of preserving 
national security by deterring large scale conventional or nuclear attack or of 
countering nuclear blackmail. 1216 
In the final analysis. since such circumstances under the alliance system were 
contingent upon American intent. any formal doctrinal articulation on Britain's 
behalf "involved questioning the word and good faith of the United States ... 127 
Nevertheless. American reliability was questioned by Britain's leaders. In this 
case. the tocsin was sounded by Neville Trotter. a Conservative MP. A 
memorandum submitted to the Expenditure Committee by Trotter warned: 
With the Soviets now in a position of equality . . .  it seems much less certain that 
U.S. President would be prepared to commit his country to the horrors of major 
nuclear attack if Britain rather than America was the subject of an initial nuclear 
assault. We must. therefore. continue to possess our own capability for nuclear 
retaliation. 1 28  
Trotter's admonition was reiterated by Geoffrey Pattie. MP. then Under­
secretary of State for Defence in the Thatcher Government: "The readiness of 
the United States to defend continental Western Europe with nuclear weapons 
is now tempered by an American realization that the Soviet voice is as strong 
as their own. In short, the guarantee of U.S. nuclear protection . . .  is no longer 
reliable ... 129 Pattie's fears were not entirely without foundation. if remarks by 
former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger are to be believed. Kissinger spoke 
in Brussels at a conference entitled "NATO: The Next 30 Years." jointly 
sponsored by Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International 
Studies and the Atlantic Institute. As reported in The New York Times for 3 
September 1979. Kissinger admonished: 
"Don't you Europeans keep asking us to multiply assurances we cannot possibly 
mean and that if we do mean. we should not want to execute. and which if we 
execute. would destroy our civilization. . 
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"Massive assured destruction created a paradoxical world in which it is the 
liberal, humane and progressive country that is advocating the most blood-thirsty 
strategy." He [i.e., Kissinger] strongly implied that he believed a United States 
President would now decline to defend Europe by ordering such an assault 
against Russian cities at a time when the Soviet Union had the means to strike 
back at United States population centers in return. 
"Of course, the U.S. President will threaten massive destruction in a crisis, but 
will he do it?" Dr. Kissinger asked. "We must face the fact that it is absurd to 
base the strategy of the West on the credibility of mutual suicide."1lO 
In Henry Kissinger's view, therefore, Western Europe-Britain included­
might be expendable in a nuclear showdown. The United States, in the fmal 
analysis. might act to save herself. even if this meant offering Western Europe 
up as sacrifice. The gauntlet thrown at the Western alliance by Dr. Kissinger 
would appear to have been accepted by Geoffrey Pattie. Before accepting his 
initial responsibility in the Thatcher government as Minister for the Royal Air 
Force, Pattie wrote, as if in direct rebuttal to Kissinger: 
It is no more than a blinding glimpse of the obvious to say that a guarantee which 
is no longer automatic is no longer a guarantee and despite the presence of U.S. 
forces on the ground in Europe in no way can there now be said to be an American 
nuclear guarantee protecting Western Europe.13I 
If America's stewardship over the nuclear umbrella had become 
problematic, then Great Britain would accept the challenge. Mrs. Thatcher's 
predecessor, James Callaghan, had advised President Carter at the Guadeloupe 
Summit in January 1979 that "a U.K. nuclear capacity was important to Alliance 
cohesion at a time of growing German doubts about the American nuclear 
guarantee in an era of superpower parity." I 32 As Callaghan would recall in his 
memoirs: 
. . . Britain had a responsibility not only for her own defense; we shared a 
responsibility for the defense of Europe . . . .  It would be necessary to take into 
account not only Britain's security but also the extent to which Germany felt the 
need for reassurance. 133 
Britain's security interests, therefore, required her to provide a nuclearurnbrella 
for Europe. The concurrence of the other Western European nations in that 
appreciation is a factor of some significance, since they appear to be reassured 
by British policy. 
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United States "Reliability" as Theme, 
Context, and Occasion: A Reconsideration 
The conceptual place of American reliability in British deterrence doctrine 
has been explored at some length in this inquiry. As theme, context, and 
occasion for possession of an independent nuclear deterrent, reliability has 
served the British well in doctrinal and policy management terms. 
Indeed, the doctrinal definition of United States "reliability" has consider­
ably widened from the cballenge posed by the passage of the McMahon Act of 
1946 to the explicit references by Prime Minister Callaghan to the need of a 
British nuclear umbrella for the reassurance Europe so badly desired. Certainly, 
British fears in this direction may have been groundless. However, in the British 
view, those fears were genuine, hence doctrinally sound. The United States will 
have no choice but to live with the strategic implications of this British 
assessment, even if it means the possibility of an alternative design for European 
security over the horizon. 
Perhaps it is well to consider this issue in a more basic context. When World 
War II ended, the United States enjoyed a monopoly on atomic weapons as well 
as a profound disinclination to share them with any other power, including Great 
Britain. The United States position may be understood in terms of a classical 
application of raw political power. The fifth century B.C. Greek historian, 
Thucydides, described the power calculus in his account of the Melian 
Dialogue: "Right, as the world goes, is in question only between equals in 
power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they 
must." 134 
Applied to the postwar world, the power calculus that drove American 
policymakers to "do what they can" to deny any further nuclear cooperation 
with the British was matched by a no less determined British compulsion, as 
the weaker power, to "suffer what they must," while at the same time trying to 
redress the imbalance at whatever cost. It was a dispute that in any case could 
not be avoided. Professor Margaret Gowing has captured the dynamics of the 
then prevailing power relationship with great accuracy: 
H the Angl�American atomic agreements drafted early in 1946 had been 
endorsed they would in no way have altered the decision to produce 
plutonium, . . . It is conceivable that if the agreement had been signed and if 
henceforth Angl�American relations had been bathed in sweetness and light, 
arrangements might have been made for the pooling of atomic weapons produc­
tion. But in view of the actual American mood at this time, such a possibility is 
not worth even a cursory exploration. As it was, American atomic attitudes in 
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this period hardened Britain·s resolution not to be bullied out of the business and 
not to acquiesce in an American monopoly. 135 
American action and British reaction are thus understandable in tenns of the 
Thucydidean paradigm. that it was the power calculus that defined the relations 
between states. It, rather than moral, ethical, or sentimental notions governed 
the definition of state interest and security on both sides. The United States 
could no more share her nuclear weapons with Great Britain than Great Britain 
could surrender her sovereign right to independently acquire nuclear weapons. 
The dynamics of the power relationships between states were starkly drawn in 
the historical reconstruction offered by Thucydides in the Melian Dialogue. In 
the Dialogue, which occurred as a brief incident in the epic twenty-seven year 
Peloponnesian War, the Athenian envoys would advise the doomed Melian 
satellite of Sparta of the brutal realities that made up power politics: 
And it is not as if we were the ftrst to make this law, or to act upon it when made: 
We found it existing before us and shall leave it to exist for ever [sic] after us; 
all we do is to make use of it, knowing that you . . .  and everybody else, having 
the same power as we have, would do the same as we do. 136 
Applied to our own time, American nuclear policy vis-a-vis Britain, has bred 
a generation of basic mistrust, notwithstanding the agreements and close 
cooperation in nuclear weapons research and development. The Anglo­
American modus vivendi, the agreement of 1958 regarding "Cooperation on the 
Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes," and the Polaris and 
Trident agreements, do nothing to change the picture. This sense of United 
States unreliability was forged early and was sustained by subsequent policy 
actions. Such a perception, reinforced as it has been, has given to British nuclear 
deterrence doctrine a theme, a context, and occasion for policy management. 
While this topic remains delicate, it can by no means be ignored. In the 
meantime, underpinning all doctrinal considerations, there must be the main­
tenance of an assured destruction capability. 
The Maintenance of Credibility 
The credibility of any strategic nuclear deterrent must, in the final analysis, 
rest upon its capacity to inflict assured destruction upon an enemy. Close behind 
possession itself, a perception of this capability by allies and adversaries alike 
is essential for deterrence to operate. The key operative element, therefore, 
is a destructive capacity that is assured and recognized by those whose 
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responsibility it is to be aware of such matters. For almost all of its existence 
as an independent deterrent force, Britain's strategic nuclear ann has possessed 
this character. 
During most of the Cold War period, the overriding strategic imperative for 
Britain was the pursuit of her so-called "Moscow Option, .. or the "Criterion," 
the belief "that it is absolutely vital for the Soviet capital to be [credibly] 
threatened at all times ... 137 To be credible, the threat posed to the Soviet Union 
by Britain would perforce have to be a unilateral one, i.e., a nuclear-anned 
Britain acting alone against the Soviet Union. In the following scenario, Soviet 
leaders were asked to consider the consequences of such a catastrophe for their 
country: 
If you should ever attack us, we have the capacity to punish you, even after the 
event, by destroying this many of your cities, and consequently part of your 
industry and population. This would not only be a grievous blow in itself, but 
would materially weaken your capacity to withstand successfully an attack from 
the United States which, for the Eurposes of this argument you will have to assume would be a separate actor. 38 
The above remarks reveal a glimpse of a core element in British strategic 
deterrence doctrine: retributive force. Some years ago, it was noted that this 
capability for retributive force in Britain's strategic arsenal compelled Soviet 
"rationality" in the Cold War: 
The Polaris force has commonly been described as an "anti-city" deterrent, 
threatening to retaliate by killing civilian citizens of an aggressor state. The threat 
is not negligible; the nuclear warheads fired by, say, two British SSBNs [i .e., 
Polaris submarines] might kill anything up to 15-20 million people in the Soviet 
Union. Even one SSBN could effectively hold 10- 15  million Soviet citizens 
hostage. In fact, however, the threat is still more extensive than that alone may 
suggest, since with only slightly different targeting, the same force could also 
destroy anything up to a quarter of the Soviet Union's industrial capacity. The 
level of threat presented by the existing force might be thought, therefore, to . . . 
deter a rational Soviet leadership from attacking Britain. 139 
The extent to which the Soviets were in fact deterred in this way by Great 
Britain is one of the great if unsung achievements of the Cold War. Lord 
Chalfont, the former AIun Gwynne Jones, had been Minister of State for 
Foreign Affairs from 1964 to 1970. Although his comments on Soviet vul­
nerability as well as his operational deftnition of credibility were made in 1980, 
they are worth repeating: 
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One of the principal elements in the effectiveness or "credibility" of the nuclear 
deterrent is the degree of uncertainty which it creates in the mind of the potential 
aggressor . . . .  In this context, Soviet leaders would be unlikely to "expect to ward 
off successfully" attacks on "large areas of key importance to them." The Soviet 
Union has one dubiously effective and obsolescent ballistic missile defense 
system around Moscow; the remainder of its cities are unprotected.l40 
Britain's task in the Cold War was therefore to strive continuously to keep 
the qualitative level of her deterrent high enough to ensure its credibility. When, 
therefore, Moscow began to build an ABM shield around Moscow, the British 
saw an immediate threat to the credibility of their "Moscow Option." Britain's 
response was the Chevaline Program. 141 Sir Hennan Bondi, Chief Scientific 
Advisor to the Ministry of Defence, has explained the "strategic rationale" 
behind Chevaline in tenns of the weapon system's qualitative dimension: the 
improvement of the Polaris warhead to maintain Britain's Moscow Option. 
Thus, whatever anti-ballistic missile defenses the Soviets might deploy, Mos­
cow would remain vulnerable to British destruction in any case. Observed 
Bondi: 
For us [Britain] to resign ourselves to have a capability that is not only 
quantitatively small but qualitatively second-rate would severely diminish 
the political effect within the Alliance of having a deterrent at all. So the 
"Moscow Criterion" goes rather far. It's rather important in the context of 
Alliance politics . . . . 
[T]he enonnous importance of Moscow in the Soviet Union is quite clear. So 
abandoning the "Moscow Criterion" would be a very severe reduction in what one 
might call '"the quality of the deterrent" and its prime task of helping to keep the peace. 142 
Thus, for Britain to possess a qualitatively first-rate deterrent capability was as 
important politically within the alliance, vis-i-vis the United States, as it was 
strategically to deter the Soviet Union. In the achievement of both missions, the 
qualitative level of the deterrent itself underwrote its credibility. 
The maintenance of the deterrent's capability was very much what Prime 
Minister Thatcher had in mind in a 1979 speech, as she warned the Soviets to 
tread cautiously around Britain's vital interests. "Let me be clear," admonished 
Mrs. Thatcher: 
The Russians do not publish their intentions. So we must judge them by their 
military capabilities. I doubt whether any Russian leader would easily con­
template a repetition of the immense sufferings through which his country went 
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less than forty years ago. But it is up to \IS to ensure that there is no doubt in his 
mind that this-and worse-would now be the price of any Soviet adventure. 
That is what we mean when we talk of maintaining the credibility of our defensive 
forces. To do this is well within our economic and technical capacity.l43 
Thatcher's speech is significant because it encapsulates the major elements 
of British deterrence doctrine: 
• The intention to unilaterally inflict retributive counter-city force upon the 
Soviets, should the provocation be great enough. Note well, the threat was not 
only to repeat the devastation of World War n but that even worse damage 
"would now be the price of any Soviet adventure." 
• The promise of assured destructive capability in Britain's nuclear arsenal 
was also present, i.e., .. that is what we mean when we talk of maintaining the 
credibility of our defensive forces." 
• Also made explicit was Britain's independent nuclear standing, vis-i-vis 
her "economic and technical capacity." 
On this last point, Mrs. Thatcher failed to reveal the imminent achievement 
of British technology to manufacture tritium independently-a hydrogen 
isotope used to fabricate thermonuclear warheads. When fused with deuterium, 
a stable hydrogen isotope, tritium serves as an explosive in hydrogen weapons. 
Since tritium enjoys a half-life of only 12.3 years, a continuous supply is 
required. Since Britain had been wholly reliant on the U.S. for its supply of 
tritium under the 1958 agreement regarding "Cooperation on the Uses of 
Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes," it was a momentous occasion 
when in January 1980 Britain announced the commissioning of its ftrst tritium 
separation plant at Chapelcross. Tritium production was scheduled to begin that 
spring. 144 
This was no small achievement in scientific terms, since the production of 
tritium is both costly and complicated, involving the cooling of lithium rods 
and the complex extraction of tritium. In fact, the extraction process adopted 
by the British was revealed as a new one which allowed tritium to be produced 
less expensively. 145 David Fishlock, of the Financial nmes, commenting on 
the significance of the event, noted that the new plant "will be making all of the 
tritium Britain expects to need, both for nuclear weapons and for peaceful 
uses ... 146 Britain's motivation for taking this step was explicitly one of 
capability and credibility enhancement through self-sufficiency. Dr. Lawrence 
Freedman, then Head of Policy Studies at the Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, suggested .. that the decision to become self-sufficient in tritium grew 
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out of concern with the anti-proliferation mood in the United States and the 
possibility of more stringent controls on the transfer of all nuclear fuels ... 147 
Such concerns were very real in the minds of British officials at this time. 
for it had not been three years since the revelation that President Carter was 
inclined to refuse renewal of the twenty-year Anglo-American nuclear coopera­
tion treaty. set to expire in 1978. This predisposition had created grave ap­
prehensions in the minds of British officials. for such a move by the government 
of the United States would not only have prohibited the transfer of nuclear fuels 
and technology but forbidden as well continued H-bomb tests by Britain at the 
underground U.S. Department of Energy test site in Nevada. Hence. the 
practical effect of such a non-renewal would be to place a developmental freeze 
on the technological evolution of Britain's independent deterrent. by turning 
the special relationship back to the period before the 1958 nuclear cooperation 
agreement. 148 That Britain had been aware of American inclinations was 
demonstrated in her announcement early in 1976 that she intended to manufac­
ture tritium in the United Kingdom. When this intention was fmally realized 
four years later. it was justified on explicitly strategic grounds: "In return for 
its investment in tritium. Britain has brought security of supply of a strategically 
important material for which previously it was wholly reliant on the U.S ... 149 
Passing almost unnoticed at the same time was the brief announcement that 
Britain had also embarked upon a production schedule to process highly 
enriched uranium "for the fltSt time since 1963 ... 1!1O Britain would. in this case. 
be utilizing a gas centrifuge process. "largely to ensure a supply of fuel for the 
power plants of nuclear submarines ... 1.51  While both technical developments 
were "not linked to any specific weapons program . . .  [they nevertheless point 
to] a continuing interest in sustaining a capability for nuclear weapons produc­
tion ... 1.52 Perhaps most of all. they underlined the sophistication of Britain's 
scientific and technological infrastructures and the decisive role played by both 
in the maintenance of Britain's assured destructive capability. 
New Directions: A Substrategic 
Role for Strategic Systems 
As Sir Michael Howard recently observed, .. the Soviet Union has disap­
peared like the Demon King at the end of a pantomime ... 1.53 With the disintegra­
tion of Soviet power. the Cold War came to an end. Saddam Hussein's invasion 
of Kuwait in 1990 and the Gulf war that ensued inaugurated a new era in world 
affairs. Threats to international peace and security could now also emanate from 
the vacuum created in the fonner Soviet Union and in that Union's fonner vassal 
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states along the periphery of Russia. The violent implosion of Yugoslavia 
heralded the return of .. the Balkans .. to world history, along with the horrifying 
possibility for wider conflict in Europe. North Korea, with an incipient nuclear 
weapons and ballistic missile program, also posed a threat to world peace. 
In this anarchic environment, The Times of London proposed in a leading 
editorial that "Britain has lost an enemy and has not yet found a role. What is 
needed is not a cumbersome defense review . . .  but a rolling response to the 
changing world ... 154 British defense policy makers have determined upon such 
a "rolling response" to the new world order by adjusting their deterrence 
doctrine to meet the challenge of sea changes in the international system. The 
British have developed a substrategic role for the new Trident II ballistic 
missile, which will enter Royal Navy service in 1995. This role will continue 
alongside the primary mission of the Trident II, which is that of strategic 
deterrence. 
Britain, it would appear, has adopted a strategy to be directed against a 
potential nuclear-armed rogue country, to deter it "from gambling on the 
calculation that nobody would contemplate using the full force of strategic arms 
against it. .. 1SS According to Royal Navy sources, once the Trident submarines 
were deployed, 
they could go to sea with a "mix-and-match" missile load, some strategic and 
some tactical. A potential aggressor would be warned that he could face a limited 
tactical strike from a Trident submarine unless he backed off. The sources said 
that if an aggressor was not sure whether he faced a tactical strike "or Armaged­
don," the doubt would increase the deterrent value. 156 
According to Malcolm Rifkind, the British minister of defence, "it was 
essential for Britain to keep full-scale strategic nuclear arms and less potent 
sub-strategic weapons ... IS7 Trident would be configured to accommodate both 
weapon systems. Speaking at the Center for Defence Studies at Kings College, 
London, Rifkind revealed that in accordance with the new doctrine he had "set 
a ceiling of 96 nuclear warheads per [Trident] submarine." The actual number 
deployed could, however, be "significantly fewer" than ninety-six, noted the 
defence minister. In any event, he was quick to point out that .. the total explosive 
power deployed on Trident would be 'not much changed' from Polaris ... 1S8 
An interesting, indeed paradoxical sidelight to this development was the fact 
that in November 1993, the British government announced it was abandoning 
plans to develop a tactical nuclear stand-off missile for the Royal Air Force­
the Tactical Air-to-Surface Missile (TASM). This system would have cost "at 
least" £1.8 billion, and the Royal Navy convinced the government that Trident 
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would be "sufficiently flexible and reliable to take on a secondary substrategic 
role."u9 In lieu of the TASM system, the current upgraded WEl77 nuclear 
gravity bomb carried in Tornado aircraft will be kept in service until the next 
century. Thus, Britain will retain strategic capability in both her airborne and 
seaborne systems. 
It would appear that Britain has chosen to cope with the uncertainties 
of the new world order by adapting her strategic deterrent to meet all levels 
of threat and to utilize her primary strategic deterrent, the Trident, in 
strategic as well as substrategic roles. What remains to be seen is whether 
this reconfiguration of doctrine and system will bring stability to the inter­
national system or be a destabilizing element. Regardless of the outcome, 
one thing is clear: in assuming this new posture, Britain has sent a message 
founded upon the ftrst principles noted at the outset of our inquiry into the 
evolution of British deterrence doctrine. That message is that functional threats 
to British interests will be resisted. Now, however, the scale of that resistance 
will be deliberately left in doubt, so the potential adversary will be forced to 
consider an even greater number of adverse developments resulting from 
actions he might take. 
Nevertheless, it is quite clear that even a substrategic nuclear response by 
Britain will constitute a momentous strategic rejoinder to a potential adversary. 
In the meantime, such considerations reveal the complexity and diversity of 
British deterrence doctrine and policy-of how they evolved and into what they 
evolved. Both doctrine and policy, however, require instruments to secure their 
realization. The forging of those instruments offers a revealing insight into the 
British political and defense cultures as nuclear weapons were developed. 
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Forging the Instruments 
Secrecy as Strategy 
O
F TRANSCENDENT IMPORTANCE in Britain's experience with an 
independent nuclear deterrent has been .. the process by which it was 
attained ... 160 The leitmotif of that process was secrecy. 
Since time immemorial, rulers have devised a variety of institutional and 
procedural techniques to preserve their secrets and to reach decisions. Such 
procedures insulate the decisional process behind a cloak of discretion so that 
adversaries will be kept ignorant of capabilities and intentions. On another 
level, by disseminating only such mind-shaping information or propaganda as 
the top political elites desire, an ambience or facade is erected behind which 
substantive policies can be pursued without attracting undue public attention. 
The seventeenth-century British statesman and philosopher Francis Bacon 
identified the principle thus: 
Concerning government, it is a part of knowledge secret and retired in both these 
respects in which things are deemed secret; for some things are secret because 
they are hard to know, and some because they are not fit to utter. We see all 
governments as obscure and invisible. 161 
In any discussion of secrecy in the context of the British system, there 
are cultural and systemic contexts to consider beyond the political or legal 
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institutional arrangements. Some years ago, the American sociologist Edward 
Shils observed in this connection: 
Although democratic and pluralistic, British society is not populist. Great Britain 
is a hierarchical country. Even when it is distrusted, the Government, instead of 
being looked down upon, as it often is in the United States, is, as such, the object 
of deference because the Government is still suffused with the symbol of 
monarchical and aristocratic society . . . .  
The citizenry and all but the most aggressively alienated members of the elite do 
not regard it as within their prerogative to unmask the secrets of the Government, 
except under very stringent and urgent conditions . . . .  
The secrets of the governing classes of Britain are kept within the class and even 
within more restricted circles. The British ruling class is unequalled in secretive­
ness and taciturnity. Perhaps no ruling class in the Western World, certainly no 
ruling class in any democratic society, is as close mouthed as the British ruling 
class. No ruling class discloses as little of its confidential proceedings as does 
the British. 
162 
The above observation applies with a particular aptness to matters nuclear. 
C.P. Snow-novelist, scientist, and Civil Service Commissioner with special 
responsibility for the Scientific Civil Service-described the context in his 
fictional account of Britain·s wartime atomic bomb project, The New Men. 163 
The protagonist, Lewis Eliot, serves as a temporary civil servant, a personal 
assistant to Cabinet Minister Thomas Bevill. Bevill is Chainnan of confidential 
scientific committees and thus is privy to the most secret infonnation. In the 
fall of 1939 Eliot, along with a colleague, is summoned to attend the minister 
in his Whitehall office. The dialogue that follows is so evocative of British 
discretion that it merits our attention: 
. . .  The first thing, said the Minister, was to forget all about the official hierarchy, 
the next was to forget that you had any relatives. If you possess a secret, he said, 
your secretary may have to know: But not your second-in-command: And not 
your wife . . . .  164 
Forget all I tell you until you have to remember-that's what I do. But the stuff 
to watch is what they call a uranium isotope. 
He said the words slowly as though separating the syllables for children to spell . 
.. u .235," he added . . . .  Bevill [then] showed us his private dossier of the uranium 
project. We must not refer to it again by that name, he said: As with all other 
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projects of high secrecy, he carried out the "appreciations" in his own hand, 
keeping no copies: The documents were then mounted in a loose-leaf cover, on 
which he printed a pet name . . . .  
He turned the cover, and we saw, printed in bold capitals, the words: 
MR.. TOAD.I6S 
The ambience is so characteristic of the British, recalling the devilishly 
naughty high spirits found among boys in the great public schools. But more 
than that, it was also symbolic of the extraordinary secrecy maintained during 
the war, which continued in the cold peace that followed. Secrecy has remained 
the modality of choice for British prime ministers in the realm of nuclear 
weapons. A number of elaborate, even extraordinary, procedures have been 
instituted over the years for the taking of decisions on nuclear weaponry and 
then for the covert measures necessary to implement such decisions. 
In the beginning, for example, Lord Portal, controller of Atomic Energy 
Production within the Ministry of Supply, reported directly to the prime 
minister: 
Portal felt that secrecy was the overriding consideration. It was not only a 
question of keeping the technical secrets from other nations, though that was very 
important. There was also the general political aspect. Was there, for national or 
international reasons, any object in conceding the fact that Britain was working 
on the development of the atomic bomb? Finally, there was the Anglo-American 
aspect. Hopes of getting help from the United States "under the counter" might 
depend on their assessment of British secrecy arrangements. If, as it seemed, the 
whole business was thrice secret it would be unwise to throw the bomb require­
ments into the nonna} departmental machinery for weapons development. Hence 
the proposal for the Portal-Penney arrangement, with Portal as the channel for 
communication for the Chiefs of Staff and Penney's work camouflaged under a 
misleading name such as "basic high explosive research." The Chiefs of Staff 
agreed to suppress any reference in their Ministries to details of manufac­ture . . . . 166 
When, therefore, Britain could no longer avoid a decision on manufacturing an 
atomic bomb, a secret and specially convened Ministerial Committee of the 
Cabinet, known as GEN 163, took the fateful decision. Joining the prime 
minister at No. 10 Downing Street on the afternoon of 8 January 1947 were 
Ernest Bevin, Foreign Secretary; Herbert Morrison, Lord President; A.V. 
Alexander, Minister of Defence; Viscount Addison, Dominions Secretary; and 
John Wilmot, Minister of Supply. 167 It is important to note that this ad hoc 
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committee met against a backdrop of severe economic crises for Britain; 
factories were closing down because they bad no coal, economic rationing was 
still in place, and general living conditions for the average citizen were 
miserable. Notwithstanding this economic climate and the enormous outlays 
that would necessarily follow a decision to proceed, Hugh Dalton, Chancellor 
of the Exchequer, was not in attendance, nor were Sir Stafford Crip:, President 
of the Board of Trade or Arthur Greenwood, the Lord Privy Seal. 1 Only three 
copies of the minutes of the meeting were made. Before the committee were 
directions on two points: Should research and development of nuclear weapons 
begin? H so, were "special arrangements" for the project to be adopted? Such 
arrangements would be similarly discreet, if not actually covert. On the fllSt 
point, Bevin, the influential foreign secretary, said "it was important that Britain 
should press on with the study of all aspects of atomic energy. 'We could not 
afford to acquiesce in an American monopoly of this new development , .. 169 
The GEN 163 Committee, therefore, took the decision to begin research and 
development on atomic weapons. On the second point before the Committee, 
the special arrangements necessary for secret development were adopted. So 
secret were they that only five or six senior officials outside Portal's organiza­
tion ever knew of their existence. Indeed, Dr. Penney, one of the key actors in 
the drama, "did not know of this ministerial meeting in January 1947 and was 
not told to go ahead until the following May ... I70 
H the Cabinet in its collectivity bad been excluded from this decision, so too 
was Parliament Just after Winston Churchill returned to power in 195 1,  he paid 
"tribute to his predecessor [Attlee] for making the initial decision and sanction­
ing the huge expenditures that bad never been revealed to Parliament Very 
soon it was common knowledge that this decision had been taken by Mr. Attlee 
without any prior discussion in the Cabinet, and that he had never revealed it 
to any but a handful of trusted friends ... 171 As Churchill put it, Attlee and his 
colleagues had "preferred to conceal this vast operation and its fmance from 
the scrutiny of the House; not even obtaining a vote on the principle in­
volved . ..  I72 
Attlee's practice with respect to the acquisition of nuclear weapons was to 
prove paradigmatic. Since the Polaris missiles supplied to Great Britain by the 
United States under the Nassau Agreement of 1962 were to enjoy a life-span 
of twenty to twenty-five years, in the mid- 1970s the British again had to make 
some highly secret, yet necessary, decisions on the future of their independent 
nuclear deterrent This was achieved by another Labour prime minister, James 
Callaghan. The latter set up a super secret Cabinet group on Polaris replacement, 
which "supervised much of the technical and diplomatic preparations" for a 
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fInal decision by a subsequent government. 173 Using this special Cabinet 
structure, "Callaghan conftded in only three colleagues, who met at No. 10 
Downing Street in conditions of strictest secrecy." The group included Dr. 
David Owen, Foreign Secretary; Frederick Mulley, Minister of Defence; and 
Dennis Healey, Chancellor of the Exchequer and a former Minister of Defence. 
The balance of the Cabinet was excluded. Callaghan's covert actions were 
publicly justified on grounds of a Labour Party election campaign promise of 
October 1974 to forgo development of the third-generation British nuclear 
deterrent after Polaris. 174 The prime minister, however, refused to allow a mere 
electoral platform of his own party to interfere with his responsibility as the 
Queen's First Minister, to act in defense of the realm. Raison d'etat prevailed, 
upheld by a secret Ministerial Committee of four. 
As it happened, the Parliamentary debate over the interim Polaris system, 
Chevaline, which took place in January 1980, was "the fIrst time in 15 years 
that MP's have debated Britain's nuclear forces ... 175 Likewise, Project 
Chevaline had been characteristically "buried away each year in the other 
research and development item and elsewhere in the defense estimates ... 176 It 
was not to be until January 1980, "almost six years after it was given the go 
ahead" by the secret Cabinet committee, that Parliament would be told the actual 
cost, £I ,OOOm.I77 
And in July 1980, Callaghan'S successor, Margaret Thatcher, a Conserva­
tive, took the fInal decision to replace the Polaris system with a successor, also 
purchased from the United States, Trident. The ministerial structure for taking 
this decision was likewise highly secret and small, smaller in fact than Attlee's 
GEN 163 Committee had been. First convened in the summer of 1979, soon 
after the Conservatives returned to power, Mrs. Thatcher's secret Ministerial 
Committee, Mise 7, included Lord Carrington, Foreign Secretary; Francis 
Pym, Minister of Defence; Sir Geoffrey Howe, Chancellor of the Exchequer; 
and William Whitelaw, Home Secretary. 178 As on an earlier occasion, not only 
had the full Cabinet been excluded from a decision involving nuclear weapons, 
but so had Parliament. In this case, the only concession the government made 
was to inform Parliament of the fmal decision, after the fact. Just for the record, 
William Rodgers, Chief Opposition Spokesman on Defence-in effect the 
shadow defence minister-challenged the government's practice in a par­
liamentary debate: 
Neither the house nor the country has had such a privilege [i.e., of fully debating 
Trident] because the information available to the Government has not been made 
available on a wider scale.l79 
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The reply of Francis Pym, the minister of defence, was instructive: "The way 
in which the Government has considered this important matter and announced 
its decision to the house is wholly in accordance with our parliamentary and 
constitutional practice ... 180 In any case, Pym added: 
It is for the Government to come to its decisions and then to present them to the 
House and to defend them there. We did arrange a debate in January. Mr. Rodgers 
says it was not adequate, but it was on our initiative . . . .  It was a useful occasion 
as a preliminary to the decision I have announced today. III 
Thus, full British Cabinets have been systematically excluded from some of 
the most crucial strategic decisions taken by postwar governments, a procedure 
that has eventuated across time, party, and ideology. While individual Members 
of Parliament were doubtless informed about these developments in one way 
or another over the years, Parliament as a collectivity has been even further 
removed from knowledge, let alone the political luxury of a vote. The closest 
Parliament came to debating a government decision on nuclear deterrence in 
1980 was post/acto! In recent years the record has improved only marginally. 
Dissimulation as Statecraft: The Thucydidean Paradigm 
High policy concerns questions and issues relative to the survival of the state. 
As such, high policy is characterized by a restriction of fundamental knowledge 
in those contexts that concern life and death issues for the state.182 Nuclear 
weaponry is a topic suitable for classification as a high policy issue; hence, an 
aura of great secrecy surrounds it in all political systems, Britain's included. 
The reason is obvious enough: the reality for a world in which sovereign 
nation-states struggle for advantage and for survival itself is that truth will be 
qualified, deliberately falsified, and otherwise contaminated by those having 
the means at their disposal to do so. Thucydides chose to begin his fifth-century 
B.C. history of the Peloponnesian War with perhaps this most important 
principle of statecraft as his first lesson. It has since become a paradigm for 
political behavior with reference to the great issues of war, peace, and survival 
itself. As to why Athens and Sparta, along with their tributary allies, chose to 
wage a mighty twenty-seven-year struggle for Hellenic hegemony, Thucydides 
wrote: 
The real cause I consider to be the one which was fonnally most kept out of sight. 
The growth of the power of Athens, and the alarm which this inspired in 
Lacedaemon, made war inevitable. III 
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All subsequent actions, therefore, were taken by Sparta either on behalf of or 
as a counter to Athenian hegemonic aspirations, despite public justifications to 
the contrary. The point is that the real casus belli was .. the one which was 
formally most kept out of sight." 
Many years ago, the American statesman Paul Nitze attempted to bridge the 
historical gap between Thucydides' time and his own. Nitze suggested the 
political institutionalization of the prevailing dichotomy between a 
government's actual interests and whatever facade of words, slogans, and 
ideologies it might choose to advance. Nitze, therefore, points out that for 
governments .. the word 'policy' is used in two related but different senses." In 
one sense, .. the declaratory sense, it refers to policy statements which have as 
their aim political and psychological effects." It is in the other sense, however, 
.. the action sense," that policy "refers to the general guidelines which we believe 
should and will in fact govern our actions in various contingencies ... I 84  Thus, 
while declaratory policy is perceived as operative by the mass public, including 
the articulate elites, in fact it is not. On the other hand, action policy, perceived 
or not perceived, is operative. The essential difference then between declaratory 
and action policies is that they exist on different levels. 
More to the point, Britain's greatest success in the policy management of an 
operative strategic deterrence doctrine has been her mastery of declaratory 
policy to obfuscate not only action policy but the strategic objectives inherent 
in it. In so doing Britain has delivered a virtuoso performance. 
Andrew J. Pierre was perhaps fmt to observe that British deterrence doctrine 
was obscured behind a facade. He explained the practice in his defmitive study 
of the British nuclear deterrent as, in part, "due to the nature of the British 
political system [wherein] . . .  'declaratory' policy tends to run ahead of 
'action' policy ... l8S The matter becomes clarified immediately if Nitze's for­
mulation is adopted and Pierre's phrasing is amended to read: "Due to the nature 
of the British political system . . .  'declaratory' policy tends to overshadow or 
obscure 'action' policy." This policy modality captured the attention of British 
defense strategists Peter Nailor and the late Colonel Jonathan Alford. 1 86  They 
wrote that: 
[Since British] Governments normally confine their explanations about strategic 
nuclear weapons policy to short descriptions of current functions of the nuclear 
forces . . .  the annual British Defense White Papers, [and] the defense debates in 
Parliament . . . the foreign policy debates that touch on this aspect of British 
security concerns, yield relatively little about strategic purposes or security 
doctrine. Certainly by comparison with the United States and French official 
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explanations and legislative discussions, the material about the objectives of the 
policy, rather than the capability to execute it, is thin. 117 
Thus, what was obscured was neither hardware nor capability but doctrine and 
the policy objectives on behalf of which such strategic hardware was deployed. 
A recent study has concluded that "part of the explanation for the relative 
neglect of British doctrines about nuclear strategy is that British thinking during 
the post-war decade was mostly conducted at an official in-house level" and 
hence was unavailable in the public domain for many years. 188 As such, for a 
good many years, strategic questions were not given the kind of exposure in the 
scholarly literature and in the political arena that they enjoyed in the United 
States. This however is disputed by other evidence: the studious avoidance of 
public parliamentary discussion was no accident. as Gowing has noted. "There 
was ignorance, deliberately encouraged by the Government. about the inde­
pendent deterrent. "189 The result of this pattern of reticence is a strategic 
deterrence doctrine that has been left unarticulated. 
H officially imposed secrecy and exegetical obtuseness have managed to 
mask content and substance, so too has the conduct of public debate. Stepping 
into the void left in British deterrence doctrine, and filling it for so many years, 
has been "prestige." As a raison d 'etre for Britain's independent nuclear 
deterrent. prestige has in fact come to serve as a substitute, even a facade, for 
an explicitly articulated and coherent strategic deterrence doctrine. Prestige has 
become an exemplar of dissimulation in the service of statecraft. 
Ever since the British began to deploy their own nuclear weapons, British 
society has been divided over the necessity for them. The question invariably 
raised has been whether Great Britain can afford the vast capital outlays 
necessary for the research, development. and deployment of nuclear weapon 
systems, particularly when those systems are being duplicated by Britain's 
closest ally, the United States. In the 1950s, some groups, such as Lord Russell's 
followers in the Committee of 100, demanded nuclear disannament. They 
argued that. in addition to being a drain on vitally needed domestic resources, 
Britain's nuclear program was a futile attempt to regain lost greatness as 
decolonization advanced. Elements in the Labour Party rank and file agreed. 
Paradoxically, many in the Conservative Party demanded an independent 
nuclear deterrent for Great Britain on precisely the same grounds; national 
prestige. 
From the 1950s to the present. therefore, prestige has actually defmed the 
tone and context for parliamentary debates, relative to the need for a distinctly 
British nuclear deterrent. Analysts too have been quick to accept the premise; 
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to cite one example of this genre: "Unlike the French, the British felt that the 
magnitude of the American arsenal made the Atlantic connection essential. 
Thus, to enhance their prestige, they wanted to play a key role alongside the 
Americans in international affairs ... 190 
While "prestige" may serve as an apologia for public consumption, it, like 
"honor," has no basis on which to create substantive policy. Shakespeare, for 
example, makes clear in Henry IY that honor is just "for show." Accordingly, 
Falstaff asks: 
Can honor set to a leg? No. Or an arm? No. Or take away the grief of a wOWld? 
No. Honor hath no skill in surgery then? No. What is honor? A word. What is 
the word honor? Air.191 
So, too, prestige. As an operational principle prestige is meaningless, since 
in the context of world affairs it has no power to compel the obeisance of others 
or even obtain a hearing; therefore, it secures no concrete objectives. On 
reflection then, prestige is neither cause nor effect, only rhetoric-cunency 
without value except as pretext. Were John Foster Dulles' dictum to be 
applied-.. It has always been necessary to look behind words of individuals [in 
this case, nations] to fmd from their actions what their true purpose is .. I92_ 
prestige would be revealed as a policy objective, thclaratory in nature. 
Examination of the budgetary allocations voted by successive British 
governments to secure an independent nuclear deterrent reveals that "prestige" 
is not a satisfactory causal explanation. Governments, after all, institute ruthless 
cost-benefit analyses to keep down expenditures. The enonnous costs relative 
to the research, development, and deployment of atomic and thennonuclear 
weapons preclude prestige as an authoritative sanction. Embarking on such a 
course demands huge infrastructural investments in the chemical, electrical, 
and metallurgical sectors. 193 
Substantive evidence of such investment should definitively factor out 
prestige as an operative element in Britain's strategic calculus. For example, 
the detonation of Britain's first atomic bomb at Monte Bello on 3 October 1952 
had been a very expensive moment indeed. Gowing assessed the achievement 
as "an extraordinary research and industrial effort involving £150 million or so 
of expenditure ... 194 In 1952, Great Britain spent some 9.9 percent of her gross 
national product (GNP) on defense. l9S Given the severe postwar austerity 
program to which Britain had subjected herself since 1945, coupled with the 
higher valuation of the pound sterling relative to the dollar then, and Britain's 
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willingness to defend her currency whatever the domestic costs-these invest­
ments were of considerable magnitude. 
The United States agreed to supply the British with Polaris ballistic missiles 
in December 1962. One authoritative source recalled that "the original Polaris 
force, excluding its operating expenses, cost Britain something like £1,600 
million [Le., £1.6 billion] at 1976 prices ... I96 In 1980, "Britain's annual expen­
diture on research, development and demonstration (R, D & D) [was] close to 
$ 10 billion, of which central government [was] providing more than 50 per 
cent .. 197 In a survey of British technology, Mervosh and Fishlock conceded 
this figure to be "relatively high compared with other major industrialized 
countries ... I98 Most important of all, they noted, "about 50 percent of it is 
directed toward defense ... 199 Not surprising, then, is the fact that "defense is a 
major industry in Britain. The nation [in 1980] spent 4.9 percent of its gross 
national product on defense, a higher proportion than any NATO nation except 
the U.S . . . .  Expenditure on defense R & D  [in 1980] was estimated at $3.3 
billion.,,200 Thus, one gets a much clearer insight into British defense allocations 
over time: 4.9 percent of GNP allocated to defense appears paltry by comparison 
with the 1952 outlay of 9.9 percent, but actually quite the reverse is the case. 
The British are currently getting far more for their defense spending as a 
percentage of GNP allocated to the strategic deterrent than it would appear at 
first glance. Evidence for this contention will be found in the data analysis 
presented in the appendix. 
The Chevaline Program to extend the life of Britain's Polaris submarines 
was first revealed in January 1980. Defence Minister Pym noted the cost to 
develop and deploy Chevaline had been £1 billion, or about $2 billion.101 Any 
doubts about funding sources were dispelled by Pym himself, who declared that 
the Chevaline Project had been "funded and managed entirely by the United 
Kingdom ... 202 
Despite the fact that the planning for Chevaline had originated under a 
Conservative government after 1970, the biggest expenditures on the project 
fell after Labour's return to power in 1974.203 Original cost estimates authorized 
by the Wilson government in April 1974 had been between £23Om to £25Om.204 
However, "soon after being sanctioned . . .  Chevaline built up to involve a team 
of about 5,000 people, spending about £2m a week. . . .  A review of the project 
in 1976 established that the Ministry of Defence had previously underestimated 
the complexity and cost and the 1975 figure of about £35Om to equip the four 
Polaris boats was increased to £6OOm and the in-service date changed from 
1979 to 198 1 .  A further review a year later led to a second revision of costs to 
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£800m. Since 1977, the only significant increases in cost now put at £1bn have 
been due to inflation."� 
In any event, following earlier established patterns of British nuclear policy 
management, it was only in January 1980, "almost six years after it was given 
the go-ahead . . .  [that] the Commons [was] given the true [cost] figure of 
£1,OOOm . . .  "206 for the Chevaline program. And of equal significance is the 
fact that only in July 198 1  did the powerful House of Commons "spending 
watchdog," the Public Accounts Committee, finally agree to launch a special 
investigation of .. the lack of fmancial control" exerted over the research and 
development of Chevaline.207 This action illustrates the fact that Chevaline's 
development was so crucial to the continued credibility of Britain's deterrent 
that its cost was no object to successive governments. It was only after the 
research and development phase had been completed and Chevaline was almost 
ready for deployment that the luxury of public discussion and parliamentary 
debate could be safely indulged. Here again, the terms of debate were ques­
tionable, focusing on the notion that "Chevaline was simply a job creation 
scheme to keep Aldermaston going" between the Polaris phase�ut and the 
deployment of its successor.208 But Chevaline-as-job-creation flies in the face 
of the entire history of the British nuclear weapons effort. The focus on 
Chevaline-as-job-creation, and not deterrence itself, actually parallels the 
utilization of prestige as a diversion away from an articulated strategic deter­
rence doctrine. Here again, the investment of blood and treasure speaks more 
eloquently than mere words. 
As the successor to Polaris, the Trident submarine will constitute the third­
generation British nuclear deterrent. Four new Trident IT submarines are being 
built and armed with American-supplied Trident missiles, the warheads of 
which will be British-made. In the fall of 1993, the British defence ministry 
revealed that 1994 was to be the "original in-service-date" for Trident. While 
original development costs (in £million) for the Trident missile system were 
projected to be £3,447, it was revealed that the estimated final development 
costs were considerably lower, at £2, 155. As for the Trident submarines, the 
original development cost of the first one was estimated to be £1 ,460, while the 
estimated final development cost was projected to be £1 ,395. Final develop­
ment costs for the second and third Trident submarines were projected to be 
£869 and £891 respectively. 209 
When the Trident decision was first announced in July 1980, the prime 
minister was questioned on her government's priorities in view of the £5 
billion price tag involved. Mrs. Thatcher's reply was instructive: .. It is the prime 
duty of government to secure the defense of the realm. Freedom is worth 
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preserving. "210 At a later point in the discussion, Mrs. Thatcher conveyed in 
very explicit tenns the operative meaning of defense of the realm: 
For us to show weakness in the face of increasing Soviet expenditure would place 
the future of this COWltry and our way of life in jeopardy. This Government will 
never do that.21 1 
These statements, however, did not put an end to the matter. The manifestly 
declaratory or dissimulative nature of "prestige" as an operative concept was 
revealed in the parliamentary debate on Trident held on 1S  July 1980, as Stanley 
Newens, Labour Member from Harlow, put this question to the minister of 
defence: "Are we not merely going in for this tremendously expensive deterrent 
for reasons of prestige? .. 212 Pym's treatment of the query was at once explicit 
and contextually consistent with the budgetary data presented above: 
There is no question of prestige or status. It has been a cold analysis of the facts 
of the situation. This deterrent capability exists to preserve the peace. It exists 
not to be used. It is the threat of the use that is the deterrent. It is not as expensive 
as a war.213 
Prestige, then, has been explicitly and officially disconfirmed as an operative 
element in British nuclear deterrence doctrine. If Britain needed a motive for 
developing an independent nuclear capability, then prestige could not have been 
the source of that motivation. "Prestige" could not have justified the level of 
investment Britain committed herself to research, design, and develop nuclear 
weapons in the postwar period. Even if, for public consumption, prestige had 
been made to serve in a declaratory sense, prestige doctrinally nevertheless 
remained disconnected from operative doctrinal considerations. In Britain's 
case, the ambiguity was contrived for important political if not strategic reasons: 
The debate about nuclear weapons seems to be intrinsically about a wider issue: 
Britain's role in international affairs. IT this is a reasonable picture of some of the 
most important political divergences about the deterrent it might go some way 
towards explaining the relative lack of authoritative exegesis over doctrine.214 
A clear discussion of Britain's role, hence her geostrategic objectives, was to 
be avoided, and to this extent prestige in its dissimulative role had served as a 
convenient diversion, an instrument of statecraft. By leaving such a topic 
ambiguous and abstract, sensitive issues are avoided. Some questions, involv­
ing the life and death of the state itself, may be situational: conditions under 
52 
Greenberg 
which unilateral steps might have to be taken, even against the interests of her 
closest ally, the United States. Such questions are, of course, embarrassing for 
all concerned, are subversive of allied solidarity when raised, and for this reason 
are best left unspoken, even if comprehended and appreciated by those granted 
the understanding. 
British officials adhere to this policy of discretion with a fidelity that 
confinns its transcendent power. Lord David Owen, former Leader of the 
Opposition Social Democratic Party, observed, with reference to Anglo­
American relations and by implication the Anglo-American special relationship 
applicable to nuclear weapons: 
Mrs. TIlatcher believes as a matter of principle that she should never display any 
public irritation with the course of Anglo-American relations, and who can say 
she is wrong? For all the occasional problems with public opinion at home, if the 
Atlantic Ocean is to be bridged and the intimacy of our relationship maintain� 
it is not a bad discipline for our friendship that we should differ only in private?! 
Discretion, then, in public discourse, with reference to the most sensitive 
elements in Anglo-American relations has been an operational principle. "Pres­
tige" has been a useful tool of policy management, substituting as a tromp l 'oeil, 
an optical illusion for real substantive policy. Nevertheless, the widespread 
acceptance of this facade as reality, in the face of empirically verifiable 
evidence to the contrary, is itself testimony to a masterful display of policy 
management, through dissimulation, by successive British governments. Such 
a display does not, however, exhaust the policy management repertoire; it 
serves rather to introduce policy management itself as a subject of inquiry. 
Policy Management for an Independent 
Nuclear Deterrent 
In her study of Britain 's development of nuclear weapons, Margaret Gowing 
wrote that Britain sought "to be a nuclear power for the sake of the influence 
this was expected to give her in Washington ... 216 A review of the sources 
confmns the accuracy of the observation. Note, for example, Foreign Secretary 
Ernest Bevin's comments on the policy management implications of Britain 
not having her own independent nuclear capability. Meeting in a secret Mini­
sterial Committee of the Cabinet, GEN 75, on 25 October 1946 (more than two 
months before a formal, but similarly secret, decision to build the bomb), Bevin 
declared: 
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We've got to have this . .  , . I don't mind for myself. but I don't want any other 
Foreign Secretary of this country to be talked at or to by a Secretary of State in 
the United States as I have just had [sic] in my discussions with Mr. Bymes. We 
have got to have this thing over here whatever it costs . . . .  We've got to have the 
bloody Union lack flying on top of it. 217 
In this instance. possession of nuclear weapons by one nuclear power was 
structurally linked to the concomitant political influence to be secured from 
another as a result. Significantly. the frame of reference was not that Britain in 
this manner sought to gain influence over the Soviet Union-ind� that 
objective was accepted as a given-but rather. over Washington. 
This theme was repeated in the "Global Strategy Paper" of 1952. As "one of 
the most significant documents in the history of postwar British defense 
policy ... 218 the Global Strategy Paper remained classified as late as January 
1983.219 The Paper was formulated by the three service chiefs. at the suggestion 
of Sir John Slessor. Chief of the Air Staff. Meeting at the Royal Naval College, 
Greenwich. between 28 April and 2 May 1952. The "Greenwich Exercise." as 
it came to be called. was "perhaps one of the most remarkable attempts of its 
kind to rethink national strategy as far as possible from first principles ... 220 
After several drafts. the service chiefs. aided now by Sir Ian Jacob. former 
military assistant secretary to the War Cabinet in World War n. forwarded the 
Paper to Prime Minister Churchill. Summarizing the Global Strategy Paper 
several months later. the service chiefs would note: '"The main conclusion was 
that provided the deterrents of atomic air power and adequate forces on the 
ground were prope� built up, and maintained, the likelihood of war would be 
much diminished." 1 Britain's nuclear bombs would have top priority in this 
strategy. While the service chiefs accepted the fact that the United States Air 
Force would play the predominant role in deterring the Soviet Union, the Global 
Strategy Paper nevertheless explicitly addressed the utilization of Britain's 
nuclear deterrent as a policy instrument. Noted Eric Grove, "The main role of 
the future British nuclear bomber force was to gain influence over the direction 
of an Allied strategic nuclear offensive towards targets of the greatest impor­
tance to the United Kingdom. "222 In 1952. this reference could only be directed 
towards the United States. 
In his study of the Sandys White Paper, Professor Martin Navias has likewise 
commented upon Britain's possession of an independent nuclear deterrent "as 
an incentive to the United States to include Britain in her strategic plans and 
her deterrent orbit. .. 223 Thus in November 1957 "a senior (though unnamed) 
official in the British Ministry of Defence informed American officials at their 
Embassy in London: 'UK nuclear weapons production was largely for political 
54 
Greenberg 
reasons, both in tenns [of a] desire to give [the] UK increased stature as a nuclear 
power and in [the] hope [that] UK possession [of] these weapons would give 
[her] greater leverage in dealing with [the] US., ,,224 
Should there be any doubt, therefore, about the proper contextual basis for 
Prime Minister Macmillan's remarks in a letter of 5 August 1 96 1  to the Queen? 
"I have always thought about American Presidents that the great thing is to get 
them to do what we want. Praise or blame we can leave to history."m In such 
comments as these, the full meaning of the Anglo-American special relationship 
emerges as a functional component of British strategic detenence doctrine. An 
uncharacteristically explicit reference to the dynamics of this process was made 
just as the Trident decision was announced: 
One policy-maker involved in the Trident decision said: "The real point of the 
British deterrent is to lock the United States into Europe. So long as we have a 
weapon that is as good as the biggest bang they can make, the Americans cannot 
disengage themselves . ..226 
Thus, the reality is that through her possession of an independent nuclear 
deterrent, and notwithstanding extensive cooperation with the U.S. in nuclear 
weapons programs, the Americans are compelled to take British interests into 
consideration. To the extent that it is so, U.S. freedom of action at the strategic 
level will be circumscribed. The following appreciation of the dilemma this 
situation presents to American policymakers is illustrative: 
Because we have assumed part of the burden which you bear in possessing these 
terrible weapons of mass destruction, and because we stand with you in our 
detennination to deter aggression, we seek to ensure that the responsibility of 
deciding when and whether this ultimate expression of force shall be used, will 
also be shared. We have the right, by virtue of this burden, to be heard in your 
counsels. And you should not forget that these weapons also give us a better 
ability than some of your other friends to stand aside from your decision, if we 
do not agree with your proposition.127 
Through such a scenario as this, British strategic deterrence doctrine is made 
manifest. But for all its theatrical ambience, such deterrent power is no less 
existentially operative and therefore exists as an elemental part of the strategic 
calculus, a force to be reckoned with. This being the case, some attention should 
be paid to the strategic systems found in Britain's nuclear arsenal, as they have 
evolved over three developmental generations. 
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The Genesis of Deterrent Systems: 
The V -Bomber 
The earliest delivery system was the V -Bomber. It was configured to 
approximate the American B-47 medium-range bomber. According to Pierre, 
it was "a most interesting historical fact that the Defence Subcommittee of the 
Cabinet made the decision to manufacture the atomic bomb . . .  in the same 
month that the V -Bomber specifications were issued. Certainly the link between 
the two actions must have been in the mind of at least one Cabinet minister."228 
By the time that Britain conducted her ftrst atomic test in October 1952, the 
V-Bomber was still virtually a prototype. Nevertheless, 
by 1954 the trend towards what might be termed an independent deterrent role 
could be read between the lines of that year's Defence White Paper: 
"From our past experience and current knowledge we have a significant con­
tribution to make both to the technical and to the tactical development of strategic 
air power. We intend as soon as possible to build up on the Royal Air Force a 
force of modem bombers capable of using the atomic weapons to the fullest 
effect."229 
Although research and development bad been ongoing since at least 1952, 
Britain officially declared her intentions to proceed with the manufacture of the 
hydrogen bomb in the 1955 Defence White Paper. These intentions were made 
manifest in the conclusion to a section on "The Tasks Before Us": 
We must therefore contribute to the deterrent and to our own defense by building 
up our own stock of nuclear weapons of all types and by developing the most up 
to date means of delivery . . . .  We must, in our allocation of resources, assign 
even higher priority to the primary deterrent.110 
Thus, the V -Bombers, which were ready to come on-stream, could be adapted 
easily to carry hydrogen bombs as well as atomic weapons. "Indeed, it was 
thought that thennonuclear bombs would require fewer bombers and neces­
sitate less accurate delivery. The very availability of the H-bomb and its means 
of transport argued for its acquisition. . . . More fundamentally, strategic 
doctrine as it had been evolving in Britain supported the H-bomb as the apex 
of an independent nuclear deterrent. "23 1 By 1955, therefore, the ftrst V-Bomber 
squadron equipped to carry atomic bombs-the Valiants-became operational. 
Nevertheless, by 1956, "three-quarters of Bomber Command's total strength 
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still consisted of Canberras that were unable to reach the Russian heartland ... 232 
Britain keenly felt this strategic vulnerability at the time of the 1956 Suez Crisis: 
In November 1956 the RAP was equipped with atomic bombs and a means of 
delivery. But since they did not constitute an effective deterrent against the Soviet 
Union, the possession of nuclear weapons did little to strengthen British resolve 
against the threat of RWISian rockets . . . . The vulnerability of the British Isles in 
a nuclear exchange and the inadequacy of the deterrent capability of British 
nuclear weapons could not have been overlooked in Downing Street.233 
More Valiant bombers were delivered to the RAP in 1956; the fltSt Vulcan 
squadron entered service in 1 957, the year of Britain·s fltSt successful H-bomb 
test. Victor bombers fltSt became operational in the spring of 1 958.234 By that 
time, Britain's sense of strategic vulnerability, so keenly felt at Suez, had eased 
considerably. Randolph Churchill, the son of Sir Winston, and an astute 
political journalist, was able to inform the American Chamber of Commerce in 
London that: 
Britain can knock down twelve cities in the region of Stalingraad [sic] and 
Moscow from bases in Britain and another dozen in the Crimea from bases in 
Cyprus. We did not have that power at the time of Suez. We are a major power 
• 235 agatn. 
For the fltSt time, we have explicit data confirming when, where, and how 
Britain·s strategic deterrent could unilaterally wreck the Soviet Union. Britain 
was no longer to play strategic hostage either to the Soviet Union or to the 
blandishments of American diplomacy. 
While Bomber Command had completed its deployment of V-Bomber 
squadrons by 1960, the Vulcans and Victors were not equipped with hydrogen 
bombs until 196 1 .236 Once fully operational, however, they constituted "a 
fonnidable offensive force. Capable of flying at over 50,000 feet and of 
reaching nearly Mach I, their altitude and speed performances compared 
favorably with the best Soviet and American bomber aircraft ... 237 By 1 96 1 ,  the 
V -Bomber force had reached full strength, 1 80 aircraft which "were capable of 
reaching the majority of industrial targets in Russia from bases in Britain and 
Cyprus." 
In assessing the British role in the containment of the Soviet Union, a good 
deal of credit must be given to the V -Bomber force of the RAP. Its role in this 
mission was neither token nor marginal: 
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The V -Bomber force of Victors, Valiants, and Vulcans, because of its proximity 
to the Warsaw Pact, had certain advantages over the American Strategic Air 
Command and had sufficient flexibility to pick out enemy targets of compelling 
local interest. It would have played a prominent part in the "flrSt wave" of a 
Western nuclear attack on the Soviet Union.238 
On delivery of Mark n V-Bombers to Bomber Command in 1963- 1964, 
Britain's strategic deterrent was further enhanced by virtue of a longer-range 
capability and attainment of a higher operational ceiling. The Mark n carried 
Blue Steel "stand-otr' bombs as well, which could be launched two hundred 
miles away from the target, thereby rendering enemy air defenses vulnerable 
to penetration. As the RAP became concerned about the vulnerability of its 
strategic deterrent force after 1958, a variety of countermeasures were taken: 
aircraft were dispersed, planes were scrambled in four minutes, and low-level 
flying exercises were held to teach bombers the techniques of radar evasion.239 
In this way, Britain sought to maintain the integrity of her deterrent's assured 
destruction capability at a time of dynamic technological change. Paradoxical­
ly, however, .. this was a somewhat melancholy struggle against obsoles­
cence . . .  for the simple reason that the V -Bomber force did not come fully of 
age until the era of missiles."240 Indeed, it was not until 1963 that the Defence 
White Paper of that year declared the V -Bomber force had reached its peak. 24 1  
How paradoxical then, that Britain's nuclear weapon systems entered their 
second generation under the Nassau Agreement of 1962, just as the ftrst 
generation air-delivered deterrent was reaching its own height. By virtue of her 
acceptance of Polaris missiles from the United States, Britain's strategic 
deterrent thereby rested on two pillars: the V -Bomber and the Polaris ballistic 
missile submarine. 
The Second Generation 
The Missiles of Polaris 
The Polaris system was ideally suited to Britain's needs. In terms of cost and 
technological level, Polaris was not priced prohibitively high or "prone to 
obsolescence. "242 Furthermore, the Polaris force was relatively invulnerable to 
surprise attack, hence could not be a causal factor in the precipitation of a crisis. 
That is to say, since Polaris was in fact invulnerable, an adversary had no 
incentive to launch a preemptive strike upon a Polaris submarine force. To do 
so would be suicidal for the initiator. Having evaded an enemy's .. ftrst strike," 
the Polaris force could then launch its own "second strike" in retaliation. The 
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Polaris missiles were counter-city weapons only, not accurate enough for 
strikes on an adversary's strategic forces. And yet the very destructive 
capability inherent in them could, and did, exert a certain stability into great­
power politics. 
The fact that only four ballistic missile submarines eventually joined the 
Royal Navy did not marginalize their impact on the strategic calculus, and, in 
particular, Britain's place in that equation. To assume anything else would be 
to misperceive the nature of Britain 's second generation deterrent and its overall 
capability. Professor Freedman has drawn the appropriate conclusion from this 
premise, to wit: 
It should not therefore be thought that, because of the comparative size of the 
arsenals of the superpowers, the missiles contained in even one Polaris sub­
marine do not present a serious nuclear threat. They could inflict a catastrophe 
of immense proportions on the Soviet people.143 
The Polaris submarine could inflict catastrophe on any people, for that 
matter. By gaining a second generation nuclear deterrent of the magnitude of 
Polaris, Britain's position as a nuclear power with second-strike capability was 
considerably enhanced. This enhancement would need to be factored into the 
global calculus of power, as much by Britain·s allies as by her adversaries. 
An understanding of the Polaris project, as well as those of its successors 
(the Chevaline replacement, and the next generation system, Trident), would 
be incomplete without some attention to program management. 
As a result of the Nassau Conference, Britain established a "Polaris Execu­
tive" organization, or CPE (for Chief, Polaris Executive), to manage the project 
from the British side. Unlike the divisions which had prevailed at the political 
level between Britain and the United States over the British deterrent, relations 
between the Royal Navy and the United States Navy were correct, professional, 
and organizationally close. The U.S. Navy assigned its Special Projects Office 
(SP), originally established to manage the American Polaris Program, as the 
liaison with the Royal Navy for the duration of the project. 
The transfer to Britain of the American experience in the Polaris program 
was actually the first of the fruits from the Nassau Conference to be harvested. 
The observations of Professor Nailor, a member of the Polaris Executive, are 
well worth repeating: 
It was inevitable that American ideas and experience should be taken as a model 
against which to set British needs: The United States Navy had been operating 
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FBM [i.e., Fleet Ballistic Missile] submarines in their fleet since November 1960 
with great success, and it would have been ridiculous not to use this experience 
and infonnation. The general pattern of operating cycles, the provision of two 
crews for each boat in order to maintain a high level of operational availability, 
and the insistence on high maintenance standards all derived from American 
practice.2A4 
One of the most significant developments to emerge from Britain's Polaris 
construction program was the fact that operations stressed the raising of 
perfonnance standards "and expectations of significant elements in the defense 
procurement process in the United Kingdom . ..245 This development was at least 
as important as the development and assimilation of nuclear shipbuilding 
technology, for it laid the groundwork for all future British efforts in this area. 
The British adopted "critical path network analysis" techniques to facilitate the 
project management mission of the Polaris Executive team. The latter insisted 
these techniques be applied by the prime shipbuilding contractors.246 This 
practice "introduced modem management science to areas both of the Civil 
Service and to private industry where it had been previously unknown ... 247 The 
British borrowed on the American experience in defense contract management, 
holding regular meetings between contractors and Polaris Executive personnel, 
to monitor production milestones. Polaris thus brought essential modem 
management techniques to British industry, with obvious possibilities for future 
civilian application. 
The Polaris Sales Agreement, signed on 6 Aprll l963, committed the U.S. 
government to furnish Britain with Polaris "missiles themselves and their 
support equipment and instructions on how to use them. Other than this, no 
other infonnation on the design of the missiles was to be included ... 248 
A special subcommittee, the "Joint Re-entry System Working Group," was 
established to manage the marriage of British-manufactured warheads to the 
American Polaris A-3 Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile System (SLBMS). 
Under the terms of the sales agreement, also, .. the Americans committed 
themselves to share infonnation on any improvement in any element of the 
weapon system and its platfonn except re-entry vehicles. Any improvements 
suggested by the British would be made available in return ... 249 
The British-designed re-entry system was proven in several experimental 
tests, one of which was an underground nuclear test conducted at the U.S. 
Atomic Energy Commission test site in Nevada (November 1965) . The Prime 
Minister announced the successful test results in the House of Commons on 1 8  
November 1965. By the spring of 1966, all design work had been completed.250 
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The ftrst test-firing of . Polaris A-3 missile by the British was conducted 
from the HMS Raolution, submerged off the Florida coast, at 1 1 : 15 A.M. on 
15 February 1968. In his study of British naval policy since 1945, Eric Grove 
declared the test to have been ". remarkable achievement of planning and 
management . . . perhaps unknown in the postwar history of the Royal 
Navy ... 251 The HMS Raolu.tion conducted her ftrst patrol in June 1968, and 
since June 1969 at least one SSBN has been on patrol at all times.252 
With respect to costs, as evidenced from Statements on the Defence Fs­
timates for 1965 and 1975, in 1965 the V -Bomber force absorbed up to 6 percent 
of the total defense budget. By 1975, however, the cost of the Polaris force was 
taking up less than 1.5 percent of the defense budget. 253 Professor Grove was 
hardly exaggerating when he concluded that Polaris "was undoubtedly the most 
successful British weapon procurement project of the whole postwar 
period ... 254 Therefore, the Chairman of Vicker Shipbuilders cannot be faulted 
for his assertion that "Polaris was the best defense bargain the British taxpayer 
ever had ... 25S 
The Chevaline Interregnum. 
Realizing that Polaris would be approaching obsolescence by the early 
1990s, Britain decided to develop and deploy a replacement for the warhead on 
the Polaris A-3 missile. This replacement, Britain hoped, would prove to be an 
interim solution to bridge the gap between the rapidly aging second-generation 
Polaris deterrent and a third-generation deterrent on the horizon. The result was 
Chevaline. This Chevaline replacement program has been overshadowed both 
by Polaris and the successor Trident n systems. Indeed, the strategic studies 
literature and American media in the 1980s generally ignored this development. 
Chevaline, however, was a far more signiftcant development than was indicated 
by the inattention it received at the time. 
The Chevaline missile had its origins in 1967, as an attempt by the u.S. to 
counteract offensively the Soviet construction of an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) 
system, code-named Galosh, around Moscow and its environs. The ultimate 
U.S. solution to the problem posed by Galosh lay in the development of a MIRV 
system, the Poseidon. The product of an advanced technology, it was believed 
that Poseidon could neutralize Soviet ABM defenses by virtue of the inde­
pendent targetability of each of the multiple warheads it deployed. In this 
dynamic environment, it was readily apparent to Britain that the overriding 
strategic imperative would be the retention of similar capabilities. This is to 
say, Britain would need to retain for herself the capability to neutralize any 
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potential threat inherent in a Soviet ABM barrier in place around Moscow. For 
Britain, therefore, pursuit of her so-called Moscow Option or the "'Moscow 
Criterion,' the belief that it is absolutely vital for the Soviet capital to be 
[credibly] threatened at all times, .. 256 would remain a strategic imperative. 
Out of the vacuum created (as discussed above) by Poseidon's non­
availability to Britain, Chevaline emerged as the solution to Britain's continuing 
strategic requirements. When the United States decided to pursue Poseidon and 
the MIRV concept, she abandoned continued research and development work 
on the less technologically advanced systems to penetrate ABM barriers. 
Poseidon had won the day: the United States was now totally committed to 
nuclear delivery systems with a MIRV configuration.257 
This departure proved to be a window of opportunity for British scientists 
and engineers. They chose to exploit fully the potential heretofore only barely 
revealed in the existing intermediate technology. Britain decided to redirect her 
own research and development away from work on a MIRV warhead and focus 
efforts on a redesigned warhead for the Polaris missile that would assure 
penetrability and greater accuracy through warhead hardening and the utiliza­
tion of decoys.258 A research program to develop miniaturized thermonuclear 
warheads was already in progress at the Aldermaston nuclear weapons research 
establishment. Aldermaston was already far along in this program by 1976, 
when it was assigned the additional task of developing the non-nuclear penetra­
tion aids (or decoys).259 
The fmal achievement that was to be Chevaline came only after a number of 
seemingly insurmountable obstacles were overcome. The Chevaline project 
"turned out to be the most complex piece of weapon system engineering ever 
undertaken in Britain." "Fearsomely complicated .. was the description of a 
senior defense scientist involved in the project. 260 
Realizing the technological complexity involved at the outset, the British 
government determined that a new managerial concept would have to be 
employed "to coordinate the efforts of an unusually large number of organiza­
tions, some in the U.S ... 261 During the peak three years of development-be­
tween 1 977 and 1980-it was estimated that about fifty companies, four 
government defense research centers, and some five thousand individuals were 
involved in the project. 262 The defence ministry chose as project chief, 
Fred East, Director of the Royal Armaments Research and Development 
Establishment (RARDE) at Fort Halstead. East approached his assign­
ment with experience in almost every previous British nuclear weapons 
program; he assembled a small project team around him at the defence ministry. 
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Aldennaston was joined by her sister research centers, the Propellants, Ex­
plosives and Rocket Motor Establishment, the Royal Aircraft Establishment, 
and the RARDE. All cooperated in the development of new propulsion systems 
for the Chevaline spacecraft and its payload. 
Of the fifty private companies involved during the three peak years of the 
project, four played decisive roles; British Aerospace, for example, was highly 
instrumental in conducting some fourteen test ftrings and flight trials from Cape 
Canaveral, Florida, beginning in September 1977. Hunting Engineering, a firm 
credited with expertise in the aerodynamics of thermonuclear weapons, per­
formed the structural design of the warhead. The complex computers and 
navigation equipment for Chevaline were developed by Sperry. A u.s. com­
pany, Bell Aerospace, provided technology on liquid fuel propulsion.263 All 
companies were required to report their progress to the appropriate research 
center. British Aerospace reported directly to the flight trials director. The 
complexity of the project itself, the coordination of diverse companies, contrac­
tors, and thousands of personnel, when combined with the great secrecy 
imposed throughout, give an impression strikingly reminiscent of the Manhat­
tan Project. 
British "Dependence" and the Special Relationship. The degree of par­
ticipation in Chevaline by American defense contractors can lend itself to an 
assumption that Britain had become technologically dependent upon the United 
States in nuclear weapons developmen�. "Dependence" however, may be a poor 
descriptive, because regardless of what the United States chooses to transfer in 
the way of nuclear weapons technology, Britain has never in any way abridged 
her sovereign right to launch nuclear weapons unilaterally. 
In Britain's case, therefore, national sovereignty over the exercise of her 
nuclear deterrent has been and is the key variable sustaining the relationship 
between Britain's nuclear intentions and capabilities on the one hand and her 
reliance upon the U.S. for key elements in her nuclear program on the other. 
Confusion over this relationship has all too often sustained a conventional 
wisdom which contradicts the reality. The fact is that British reliance on the 
United States for support of various aspects of her nuclear weapons program 
has actually enhanced the independent nature of the British nuclear deterrent. 
It is somewhat of a paradox that "while Britain has been obliged to look to the 
United States as a source of strategic delivery vehicles, contingency planning for 
their use has increasingly allowed for a greater range of independent action, 
apparently in pursuit of a standing alone option ... 264 Since this capability has given 
Britain the requisite "operational independence," she is given the instrumentality 
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thereby to make an "attempt to exert influence over current Alliance nuclear 
policy . ..265 Thus, if "dependence" upon the u.s. bas been an additional factor 
allowing Britain greater operational independence, it is a strange and paradoxical 
dependence indeed that also allows Britain to exert influence over u.s. policy. In 
an analytical tour de force, Freedman and his colleagues have observed this 
relationship to be a clever British stratagem, utilizing dependence as an instrumen­
tality by which to secure greater interdependence with the United states: 
Dependence on American nuclear hardware, it might be argued, bad eased 
Britain into United States nuclear policy-making, since the way to be consulted 
was to make consultation necessary. 266 
Dependence thus becomes for Britain the beginning of policy influence 
rather than its object IT this is so, then dependence in this context needs to be 
redefmed in tenns of the results it obtains for Britain vis-i-vis the United States 
in the policy arena. These results are but a function of the operational inde­
pendence of Britain's nuclear deterrent. 
Nuclear capability-British nuclear capability-thus functions as the 
mother of consultative necessity. In any event, in Britain's case, this depend­
ence or cooperative interchange with the United States should not be interpreted 
as a status in which Britain lacks sovereignty over her nuclear deterrent British 
dependency in the context of the special relationship, therefore, has a special 
meaning. Dependence is not an example of a two-key system for firing. with 
the United States retaining custodianship over one or both of the nuclear keys. 
The reality is. rather. an explicit example of the application of sovereign. 
nation-state power: 
1be lack of self-sufficiency only really matters if it interferes with operational 
independence. This is a matter of degree and is contingent on the timing and 
extent to which the British could operate in a nuclear crisis in the face of active 
American attempts to prevent this (which, some suggest, might even include an 
American antisubmarine warfare [ASW] effort against the British nuclear­
powered ballistic missile submarines. Although problems could arise if 
American communications and navigational satellites were unavailable, it would 
seem that if a British Prime Minister wanted to launch a nuclear strike, it would 
be difficult for the United States to physically prevent this.267 
So much for the contention that Britain's dependence on the United States 
in any way abridges Britain's sovereign right to take independent action using 
strategic nuclear weapons. 
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PerjormlJ1U:e Cluuvu:terlstics and StrtJUgic Assess1MlIt. While Chevaline 
was secretly developed, the performance characteristics of the weapon system 
have nevertheless been discussed in the open literature. What has been revealed 
is an awesome. death-dealing instrument of destruction. as the following 
description makes clear: 
"Chevaline" . . . is reported to consist of a maneuvering spacecraft (post-boost 
vehicle) OIl each missile loaded with two or three warheack and a large number 
of balloon decoys. The warheads (themselves inside balloons to make them 
indistinguishable from the decoys) are directed at the same target area but on a 
number of widely differing trajectories. In order further to enhance penetration 
all of one submarine's missiles are rued at the same target area. the payloads 
being timed to appear simultaneously to present the largest number of threats OIl 
enemy radar. The warhead balloons and decoy balloons were specifically 
designed to exhaust the exo-atmospheric "Galosh" antiballistic missile (ABM) 
system defending the Soviet capital. 2M 
The single strategic factor inherent in the Chevaline system which rendered 
it so awesome was revealed to the House of Commons by the defence minister 
in January 1980. Britain's Polaris force. said Mr. Pym. was now "effectively 
invulnerable to preemptive attack . ..  269 Here again. we can date with specificity 
another milestone in the historical evolution of Britain's independent nuclear 
deterrent. On the basis of these demonstrated capabilities then. we are in a 
position to examine the consequences of Chevaline in tenns of the strategic 
calculus. 
The Chevaline project reconfmned Britain·s ingenuity at complex problem­
solving, engineering, and building on the Polaris experience, her expertise in 
the utilization of highly sophisticated organizational skills to manage a program 
of Chevaline 's complexity. Britain·s great achievement in this effort cannot be 
ignored. notwithstanding the critical assistance rendered by American com­
panies during the course of the program. 
One measure of that achievement is indicated by the apparent lack of 
American success at fmding a solution to the continuing strategic defence 
problem of "midcourse discrimination above the atmosphere." As late as 1992. 
an American interceptor rocket known as the Exoatmospheric Re-entry 
Vehicle Interceptor System (ERIS) failed to destroy a mock warhead carried 
by a land-based Minuteman ICBM in a Pacific test-firing. The ERIS interceptor 
rocket was designed to intercept an approaching warhead and destroy it by 
impact. In the 1992 test failure it was reported .. that the interception failed in 
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part because a balloon decoy deployed with the mock warhead was farther from 
the warhead than planned." The purpose of the decoy "was . . .  to simulate the 
kinds of defensive techniques that a real [ICBM] would use to try to fool an 
interceptor. A real missile would carry numerous decoys, as well as chaff and 
other false targets. "270 It would appear that this technical problem has plagued 
American engineers for many years. A 1984 report sponsored by the Center for 
International Security and Arms Control at Stanford University concluded; "No 
one has yet solved the original problem which plagued the Nike Zeus project 
in the 1950's-how to tell the real [warheads] from decoy and sensor noise. "271 
Assuming that the Soviet Union was similarly unsuccessful, Francis Pym's 
remarks about the invulnerability of Britain's Polaris fleet as a result of 
Chevaline has a much clearer contextual basis. It is just this context that renders 
to Chevaline the extraordinarily high deterrent value which it has enjoyed. In 
the fmal analysis, Britain's achievement with the Chevaline project must be 
measured against that standard. 
The Royal Navy held acceptance trials for Chevaline, as scheduled in 
January 1982. The SSBN, HMS Renown, successfully launched a missile, 
anned with the Chevaline warhead, thirty miles off the Florida coast on 30 
January 1982.272 The Renown and her sister, HMS Revenge, underwent refit 
to receive Chevaline warheads in 1982. By 1984, the Chevaline was deployed 
on all four Polaris submarines.273 
By thus reconfirming Britain's position as a key player in the strategic 
nuclear arena, Chevaline kept Britain "in the nuclear game." As David 
Fishlock, was to observe, Chevaline's development "has now brought Britain 
abreast of the latest U.S. developments in warheads for ballistic missiles. "274 
Only then was Britain able to harvest the fruit of her labors-access to Trident, 
the third-generation nuclear deterrent. As a high-value strategic asset, 
Chevaline was to be used as a bargaining counter in Britain's acquisition of 
Trident missiles from the United States. Trident would greatly enhance the 
number of target options available or open to British attack, including har­
dened military targets, which she could acquire with an attack not possible 
heretofore. 
Trident IT: The Third Generation 
Britain's development of Chevaline was a very great political and strategic 
achievement, but success was purchased at a terribly high price. Whereas the 
entire Polaris program cost £1 .7  billion at 1980 prices, the Chevaline upgrade 
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would burden the government with costs of almost 60 percent of the original 
Polaris budget (i.e., an additional £ 1  billion).27s 
This demand for a Polaris replacement warhead came less than a decade into 
the life cycle of a program that had been scheduled to last until the 1990s. 
Britain, therefore, could not easily afford so soon afterward to bear the cost of 
a similar program for its third-generation deterrent. And yet Britain required a 
new nuclear deterrent if she intended to continue as a nuclear power into the 
twenty-fust century. Trident was the solution to this requirement.276 
The decision to acquire a third-generation strategic system was announced 
in Parliament in July 1980. Commenting on the inherent strategic capabilities 
of Trident, The New York Times military affairs correspondent observed, 
"There can be no doubt that acquisition of the Trident would transform Britain's 
nuclear stance ... 277 The Trident missile-for which Britain would manufacture 
the warheads-has a range in excess of four thousand nautical miles. 
In March 1982 the British government announced that it had decided to forgo 
purchase of the Trident I C4 missile system and purchase instead the more 
advanced Trident II D5, for £7,000m. This action occurred just before the 
outbreak of the Falklands War, at a time of planned decline for the Royal Navy. 
Britain's reversal was actually precipitated by President Ronald Reagan's 
announcement that the Trident D5 would be entering u.s. naval service in 
December 1989. This was earlier than planned, and in any event before Britain's 
own Trident I was to be deployed.278 Britain had, of course, faced similar 
dilemmas before. As Prime Minister Thatcher was to explain, "If we were still 
to go ahead with Trident I we risked spending huge sums on a system that would 
be outdated and increasingly difficult to maintain as the Americans went over 
to Trident 11 ... 279 The British did not wish "to be caught again with the 
' logistical, operational and fmancial penalties' of deploying a system soon to 
be replaced in the American inventory ... 2
80 
In any event, the prime minister determined to follow a course that would 
successfully bond a strategic imperative to economic realities: "The more we 
considered the question the more it seemed that if we were to maintain a credible 
deterrent, which I was utterly determined we should do, we must indeed have 
the Trident II. But we must get it on the best possible tenns ... 28 1  The American 
tenns for the Trident II were especially favorable, more advantageous even than 
for Trident I. Under the new arrangement, Britain was to be "protected . . .  com­
pletely from escalation of development costs." The u.s. would "waive certain 
provisions of the Buy American Act and advise British industry on how they 
could compete, on equal terms with American industry, for subcontracts for 
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weapon system components for the program as a whole, including the American 
program . ..282 
Nevertheless, this arrangement was arrived at only after bard bargaining on 
both sides. The British had fought to secure a fixed percentage of subcontract 
work for their companies. Final agreement was reached allowing Britain to 
purchase the Trident n DS missile at the same price paid by the United States 
Navy, in accordance with the tenns of the Polaris Sales Agreement. Equally 
significant was the fact that .. the additional overheads and levies would be lower 
than would have been the case under the 1980 agreement to purchase Trident 
I. .. 283 Furthermore, it was agreed that Britain would not demand a separate 
stockpile of Trident missiles, but rather would share the assembly and refur­
bishment facilities at the U.S. Naval Submarine Base at King's Bay, Georgia.2M 
This arrangement would result in considerable savings for Britain just when 
expenditures for the Royal Navy were coming under increasing pressure for 
reduction. 
But whatever the financial burdens to be borne, they were more thanjustified 
by the degree of deterrence purchased. For Prime Minister Thatcher, the 
credibility of the British nuclear deterrent was not a matter of ambiguity, but 
of clarity. In the prime minister's lexicon, credibility was less a function of 
alliance-in particular, American reliability-than it was of Britain 's capability 
as a sovereign, thermonuclear-armed nation-state, to wit: 
It was the Soviet perception of the strategic threat which would ultimately 
detennine its credibility-and whatever doubts they might have about America's 
willingness to launch strategic weapons in defense of Britain, they would never 
doubt that a British Conservative Government would do so.w 
According to an authoritative account, in the mid- 1980s, Britain's Polaris 
force was capable of attacking every city with a population of 1 million or more 
in the then Soviet Union. With the acquisition of the Trident n, that capability 
would be enhanced, bringing all Soviet cities with populations over a hundred 
thousand under threat of annihilation.286 Given this capability, and in light of 
the political disintegration of the Soviet Union, what added value, if any, does 
the Trident purchase bring to Great Britain? The imminent deployment of 
Trident by the Royal Navy has stimulated a debate on this subject among the 
informed public in Great Britain.287 Perhaps the clearest rejoinder to the implicit 
overkill presumption surrounding Trident was offered by Lord Ian Orr-Ewing. 
At the time of the Polaris Agreement in 1962- 1963, Lord Orr-Ewing was Civil 
Lord of the Admiralty. In a letter to the editor of The TImes, he declared that 
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any agreed upon reductions in American and fonner Soviet nuclear stockpiles, 
due to the passing of the Cold War, were "completely irrelevant [to Britain·s] 
need to replace Polaris by Trident." The operative doctrinal assumptions 
offered were cogent: 
F'ust, we have always followed a policy of minimum strategic nuclear deterrence. 
This means having enough nuclear warheads capable of inflicting an absolute­
not a relative-level of damage on a potential attacker sufficiently great to deter 
him from nuclear aggression. 1be superpowers have not followed such a policy, 
acquiring instead enonnously bloated nuclear stockpiles. 
lust as we decided our minimum nuclear requirements in the past without 
reference to superpower totals when they were dramatically rising, so we must 
choose our minimum requirements for the future without reference to those totals 
now they are due to fall. 
Secondly, in determining the number of warheads needed for the next 30 years, 
we must choose a system sufficiently flexible to constitute a minimum deterrent 
not only at the start but also at the end of that 3O-year period . . . .  
Rigidly to choose exactly the same warhead total for the next 30 years as has 
sufficed as our minimum since the Chevaline upgrade is to assume that prolifera­
tion dangers and ABM defenses will not increase and improve respectively during 
the lifetime of Trident. That would be a reckless assumption.211 
Resonating through this analysis were the fllSt principles of British policy 
articulated by Winston Churchill so many years before, a public testimony, if 
one were needed, to their continuing validity. Their transcendent nature may 
be discerned in the comments of the then defence minister, Tom King, as 
Britain·s fllSt Trident submarine, HMS Vanguard, was unveiled to the public 
in March 1992: 
We will ensure that at all times there is one nuclear deterrent submarine on patrol, 
unseen, undetectable and unattackable. That submarine will carry the minimum 
load necessary to ensure the credibility of our deterrent against any potential 
289 aggressor. 
In any event, in the British view, Trident is not a redundant weapon system 
which adds little if any value to the strategic power equation. Rather, Trident 
is the sine qua non for Britain's continued standing as a nuclear power in the 
unstable period lying just ahead. As Defence Minister King put it: 
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Our independent strategic nuclear deterrent has been the ultimate �tee of 
our security. In these uncertain times, Trident will assume that role. 
In the [mal analysis, Trident was purchased on the equity of the independent 
nuclear deterrent Britain had conceived, nurtured in development, and 
deployed. The struggles of previous generations of British leaders to obtain 
American strategic systems were minimal in comparison with the case of 
Trident. The act of acquisition was therefore a confirmation of Britain's 
continuing status as a nuclear power actor in the world and of the continuing 
resilience of the special relationship prevailing in nuclear weapons between the 
United States and United Kingdom governments. 
But what of the future of British deterrence? What are Britain's objectives 
and options in the new world order? The answers to these questions should 
assist us in our efforts to understand the British approach to nuclear deterrence. 
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The Past Is Prologue 
GREAT BRITAIN'S SEARCH for an independent nuclear deterrent has been waged with a purposeful dedication. Her quest has been charac­
terized by a clear commibnent to Churchill's first principles of national interest; 
brilliant, innovative feats of engineering; and a statecraft that has proved 
masterful. Britain's great success in this endeavor must be seen in the context 
of American policies, which have varied in tone from cooperation to am­
bivalence, and from hostility to quarantine. Britain's success in overcoming the 
obstacles placed in her way is a tribute to her policy management skills. From 
the British perspective, while American cooperation has been achieved, 
American rejection of Britain's nuclear pretensions a priori, the concomitant 
periodic opposition to Britain's vital interests (such as at Suez), along with the 
hints of strategic "decoupling" from Europe heard in these last years, have 
encouraged British officials to question the reliability of the United States. From 
each painful experience at American hands, whether it was the McMahon Act, 
Suez, the Skybolt crisis, or the acquisition of Poseidon, Britain has drawn 
painful conclusions, sometimes fairly, other times unfairly. Such conclusions 
have had a perverse effect upon Anglo-American relations, for they have 
legitimized the nationalist tendencies-the "stand alone" themes-in British 
nuclear deterrence doctrine. 
To understand why a nation seeks to become a nuclear power is to understand 
the forces that drive the calculus of power in the world. Many years ago, Lester 
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B. Pearson, a fonner Canadian prime minister and Minister for External Affairs, 
observed that there were "nuclear powers and Nuclear Powers." And, just as in 
the days of Thucydides, when Melian "power" did not equate with the power 
of either Athens or Sparta, Pearson pointed out the existential nature of the 
disparities that exist in our own time between nuclear-anned nations: 
True, we enjoy all the old-fashioned pride and privileges of sovereign inde­
pendence. But it is also true that this sovereignty does not give us control over 
the decisions which determine our destiny. You have to be a superpower with 
the hydrogen bomb to enjoy all the attributes of sovereignty now-and, perhaps 
not even then.291 
Prime Minister Harold Macmillan's systematic defense of Britain's pursuit of 
a hydrogen bomb, at a time when the United States already enjoyed possession, 
is therefore illustrative: 
It is a good thing we should have an independent contribution to the deterrent. I 
am interested to see that some of the people who don't want to have it are the 
most hostile to the United States and are more anxious that our policy should not 
be subservient to the United States. The independent contribution . . .  gives us a 
better position with respect to the United States. It puts us where we ought to be, 
in the position of a great Power.292 
The independent deterrent, then, was Britain's instrument to achieve the 
great power position which alone would facilitate the furtherance of her most 
vital interests. To secure those interests, therefore, meant having a nuclear 
"voice." Macmillan's successor, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, spoke to this issue: 
Britain's nuclear ann is our sole defense against blackmail by a nuclear power 
and it is our passport to the highest councils of the world where matters of peace 
and war are decided in the nuclear age.293 
Britain's quest for an independent deterrent, then, was never a quest for 
prestige or status, was never sought as an end in itself, but as a strategic 
instrument to allow Britain to project a great power voice in the Council of 
Nations. Britain's past success in this effort should be viewed as an accurate 
prologue for the future. 
Britain has been conventionally portrayed in the literature as a "Medium 
Power," an appropriate label if the criterion is only quantitative: the relative 
number of nuclear missiles and warheads in a nation's inventory.294 H, how­
ever, other criteria are applied-independent, sovereign command and control 
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over weapon systems, the configuration of the strategic systems deployable and 
their destructive capability, regardless of the warhead inventory-then the 
conventional labels might not apply so easily. Samuel P. Huntington has 
pondered this categorization question and provided another criterion beyond 
that mentioned to take the true measure of a nation-state. Wrote Professor 
Huntington, '"The ultimate test of a great power is its ability to renew its 
power. ,,295 In light of the evidence that I have presented., Britain not only fits 
this paradigm but is its prime exemplar. 
Future Trends 
The end of the Cold War and the passing of the Soviet threat., such as it 
existed, has not meant a concomitant "end of history" or an end to disorder and 
threat of war. Indeed, the very instability of Russia and the uncertainties there 
resulting from economic chaos and the rise of nationalist xenophobia compel 
Britain to retain her "Moscow option" as a strategic hedge and ultimate 
deterrent. Speaking at an international conference on security, held in Munich 
on 5 February 1 994, Malcolm Rifkind, the minister of defence, warned that 
Russia's designs on her neighbors constituted the most immediate short-term 
security threat.296 
Britain's long-term objectives were revealed in a seminal address given by 
Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd to the Royal Institute of International Affairs 
in January 1 993. Defining the purpose of British foreign policy, Hurd noted: 
British foreign policy exists to protect and promote British interests . . . .  We are 
not going to achieve a total new order, by ourselves or with others. But an effort 
comparable to those of 18 15, 1919 and the years after 1945 is needed if the 
international community is to avert a continuing slide into disorder: And in that 
effort Britain will be expected and will wish to play a worthy part.297 
Presenting the contemporary international scene contextually alongside the 
other major watersheds of international history since 1 8 1 5, Hurd signaled 
Britain's intention to be a major player on the world stage in the coming years. 
Left out of Hurd's remarks was the key element, without which Britain could 
not play the role to which she aspired, a role to set aright the "new disorder": 
possession of an independent nuclear deterrent. 
As the old, familiar Cold War landmarks fade, new ones appear. Thus, 
Germany is once again united. The ancient lands of Eastern Europe and Russia 
are feeling renewal as sovereign nation-states, anxious to rejoin the West and 
the world community at large. The Arab nations and the Palestinian people 
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together are seeking to fmd common ground with Israel in an effort to settle 
one of the most intractable conflicts of the postwar period. 
The United States too is undergoing profound change-turning inward to 
face domestic problems, even as she attempts to meet her foreign obligations. 
All this is taking place in a period of budgetary retrenchment and a downsizing 
of the nation's armed forces. In the midst of these changes, the strategic calculus 
itself may be shifting. Jacques Attali, the French economist and former presi­
dent of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, has pointed 
out the alarming fact that 
. . .  the ills that beset American society are likely to grow in severity, making it 
difficult for the United States to maintain its imperial posture without embracing 
the path of wholesale economic restructuring . . . .  The impressive projection of 
massive American military force halfway across the World [in the Gulf war] blurs 
rather than illuminates the larger question of America's real position as a fading 
hegemonic power, not a revived one.298 
Whether or not this grim "declinist" prophecy is fulfilled will depend on the 
strength of American economic, political, and military strategies needed to 
defeat it. 299 In the meantime, the United States will pay close attention to 
Britain's interests and, where necessary, heed her counsel. 
The Physics and Metaphysics of Deterrence 
As we move toward a new and as yet undefmed world order, what stands 
out amidst the dynamics of change is the enduring nature of the Anglo­
American special relationship. The enduring quality of this relationship, despite 
the transient incompatibilities of presidents and prime ministers, is a testimony 
to American pragmatism and British policy management. In this effort, 
Britain's prime ministers, from Attlee on, have proven themselves subtle 
practitioners of the art of statecraft. They have managed to keep high secrets 
even from Parliament when necessary, cajole American presidents to bend to 
their wishes, and develop nuclear weapons, the independence of which they 
have managed to preserve. With the solidification of the special relationship, 
Churchill's great strategic objective is confirmed: the binding of the United 
States to the United Kingdom in order to secure Britain's vital interests and to 
manage jointly the world power balance. 
Britain's independent nuclear deterrent thus becomes the essential prereq­
uisite for realization of an interdependent nuclear relationship with the United 
States. Hence, the special relationship, as a tie that binds, will not be broken for 
74 
Greenberg 
the foreseeable future, because it cannot be broken. Nor, for that matter, should 
it be broken: both nations have too much to unite them, and a joint interest in 
the maintenance of world peace. 
In the fmal analysis, Britain's possession of nuclear weapons should be 
understood in terms of Winston Churchill's observation about the dynamics­
the physics and metaphysics-of strategic relationships. Speaking in a March 
1955 parliamentary debate, Churchill declared: 
Personally, I cannot feel that we should have much influence over [American] 
policy or action, wise or unwise, while we are largely dependent as we are today 
upon their protection. We too must possess substantial deterrent power of our 
own . . . . 'JIJO Then it may be that we shall, by a process of sublime irony, have 
reached a stage in this story where safett, will be the sturdy child of terror, and 
survival the twin brother of annihilation. I 
The evolution in the strategic calculus since that time allows Britain to 
assume a far more credible independent stance vis-i-vis the United States in 
world affairs than heretofore possible, even as the special relationship binds 
both nations ever closer together. And that, after all, has always been the 
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Notes to Table 1 and Graph 1 
The discrete nature of Britain's nuclear deterrence program has always 
prevented an accurate assessment of cost allocations. In the pest. funds for 
atomic and thermonuclear research, development, and deplo)'meut have been 
successfully hidden under other budgetary categories. Thus, H.M. Central 
Statistical Office has chosen to issue the following caveat in itsAnnual Abstract 
of Statistics: "because of changes in the responsibilities of the Ministry of 
Defence, expenditures in successive years are not necessarily comparable." See 
Great Britain. Central Statistical Office, Annual Abstract of Statistics, 198 1 ed. 
(London: H.M. Stationery Office, 198 1), Table 7.2, Defence budget: Annual 
expenditures [1]  [2] , p. 190, n. 3. Accepting this statement at face value, it 
nevertheless appears that the official data do reveal a consistent pattern of 
growth in the strategic nuclear deterrent. Consequently, while the actual 
budgetary allocations in the strategic sectors are most likely obscured for 
reasons of national interest, those data that have been made available in the 
public domain do reveal a consistent, if cyclical. pattern of 6!OWth in the 
evolution of British strategic deterrence forces. It is the structure of that growth 
factor that I have endeavored to illuminate. 
apor data on GNP covering the years 1947-48 to 1970-7 1 ,  see Great Britain, 
Centn:J Statistical Office, National Income and Expenditure (London: 
H.M.S.')" various years) . Quoted in Pierre, Nuclear Politics, Table I ,  p. 343. 
GNP data for the years 197 1 -72 to 1 979-80 may be found in Great Britain, 
Central Statistical Office, Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1 98 1  ed., Table 14. 1 ,  
Gross National Product by Category of Expenditure, p. 345. 
GNP data for 1980- 8 1  is the author's own estimate. 
GNP data for 1 98 1 -82 may be found in Great Britain, Central Statistical 
Office, Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1988 ed. (London: H.M. Stationery 
Office, 1 988), Table 14. 1 ,  Gross National Product by Category of Expenditure. 
hoefense expenditures for 1 947-48 to 1970-7 1 are referenced in Pierre, 
Nuclear Politics, Table 1 ,  p. 343. 
Por the years 197 1 -72 to 1978-79, see Great Britain, Central Statistical 
Office, Annual Abstract of Statistics, 198 1  ed., Table 7.3, Defence budget: 
functional analysis of the annual estimates. p. 190. 
Por the years 1 98 1 -82, see Great Britain, Central Statistical Office, Annual 
Abstract of Statistics. 1982 ed. (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1982), Table 
7.3, Defence budget: functional analysis of the annual estimates, p. 1 89. 
COata on Defense spending as a percentage of GNP for the years 1 947-48 to 
1 970-7 1 , may be found in Pierre, Nuclear Politics, Table 1 , p. 343. 
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The 1980-81 rate is an eslimate based on the author's projection of 1980-81 GNP. 
'Data on strategic nuclear deterrent expenditures for the years 1947-48 to 
1952-53 inclusive includes expenditures on atomic weapons, expenditures for 
the Royal Ordnance Factories where weapons fabrications were undertaken. as 
well as on other annaments relative to the atomic bomb project. Source: 
Margaret Gowing, Independence and Deterrence: Britain and A.tomic Energy, 
1945-1952: VoL 2, Policy Execution (New York: Sl Martin's Press, 1974), 
Appendix 16, Atomic Energy Annual Expenditure: Table 1 Annual Expendi­
ture, January 194t;-March 1953, p. 85. 
Further data by year are not available prior to 1963-64. 
1963-64 data are from Freedman, Britain and Nuclear Weapons, Appendix 
3, Expenditure on Nuclear Weapons, p. 144. 
Data for 1965-66 to 197 1 -72 have been aggregated as follows: V-Bomber 
costs, Polaris costs and Special Materials costs. Source: U.K., Annual Defence 
Estimates; Twelfth Report from the Expenditure Committee, Session 1972-
73, Ministry of Defence. Quoted in Freedman, Britain and Nuclear Weapons, 
Appendix 3, Expenditures on Nuclear Weapons, p. 144. With reference to 
"Special Materials," Freedman notes: "'Special Materials' included materials 
for nuclear warheads and bombs and for the propulsion units of all nuclear 
submarines. This line item did not appear separately after 197 1 -72. This is 
now incorporated into the figure for strategic nuclear forces of which it 
constitutes a small proportion." Ibid. 
V -Bomber Force Polaris Special Materials Total 
1965-66 £1 86m £42m £2.28m 
1966-67 4Sm £6Om SSm 160m 
1967-68 39m 6Sm 40m 144m 
1968-69 2Sm 70m 3 1m 126m 
1969-70 Sm SSm 32m 92m 
1970-7 1 * 32m 24m S6m 
1 97 1 -72 34m 20m S4m 
*Beginning in 1970-7 1 ,  the V -Bombers were no longer counted as strategic 
nuclear deterrent forces, but listed under another line item in the Annual Budget. 
Data for 1972-73 to 1980-81  are from Great Britain, Central Statistical 
Office, Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1981  ed., Table 7.3, Defence budget: 
functional analysis of the annual estimates, p. 190. 
Data for 198 1 -82 are from Great Britain, Central Statistical Office, Annual 
Abstract of Statistics, 1982 ed., Table 7.3, Defence budget: functional analysis 
of the annual estimates, p. 1 89. 
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OWbereas the rust U.K. atomic test was not carried out until October 1952 at 
Monte Bello, the heavy expenditures on atomic weaponry during the period 
1947-48 to 1952-53 fell in research and development activity. Accordingly, 
for those years I have listed the net total, Atomic Energy Annual Expenditures, 
minus the allocations for "Weapons expenditure," which are listed above, at 
n.d. Source: Gowing, Independence and Dete"ence: VoL 2, Policy Execution, 
Appendix 16, Table I, p. 85. 
In any case, bomber squadrons anned with atomic bombs were not opera­
tional until late 1956. See Freedman, Britain and Nuclear Weapons, p. 4. 
After the years 1952-53, no further data are available again until 1962-63. 
Data for 1962-63 and 1963-64 as well as 1964-65 are from Great Britain, 
Central Statistical Office, Annual Abstract o/Statistics, no. 102, 1965 ed. Table: 
Exchequer revenue and expenditure, p. 269. A footnote indicates that " Atomic 
Energy vote expenditure is divided between Defence and the civil item 'Univer­
sities and Scientific Research. , .. See ibid., p. 269, n. 6. 
The data listed on the top line for the years 1966-67 to 198 1-82 are from 
Great Britain, Annual Abstract o/Statistics. For 1966-67 to 1976-77, see 1976 
ed., Table 1 80, Defence budget: functional analysis of the annual estimates, p. 
187. For the years 1977-78 to 198 1 -82 inclusive, see 1982 ed., Table 7.3, 
Defence budget: functional analysis of the annual estimates, p. 189. 
Note: Table 7.3, Defence budget: functional analysis of the annual estimates 
does not appear in the Annual Abstract 0/ Statistics after 1982. 
(Freedman has disaggregated research and development data to isolate R &. D 
devoted exclusively to the strategic nuclear deterrent. This disaggregation has 
been tenned "other R &. D." Accordingly, for the years 1966-67 to 1979-80, 
Freedman's "Other R &. D" will be listed directly beneath those research and 
development data noted above, at n.e., and for purposes of differentiation will 
be placed in parentheses. Freedman's rationale is as follows: "R &. D in the 
strategic forces is covered under the heading 'other R &. D. ' This also includes 
expenditure on the management of the whole R &. D effort in MOD, work 
undertaken using MOD facilities and personnel for other government depart­
ments, and also work on tactical nuclear weapons." Freedman, Britain and 
Nuclear Weapons, Appendix 3,  "Expenditures on Nuclear Weapons," p. 144. 
In keeping with a consistent fonnat, the second (i.e., bottom) R &. D 
expenditure on nuclear weapons for 1980-8 1 ,  is the author's own estimate. 
Since the R &. D expenditure for nuclear weapons was 18  percent of the total 
research and development expenditure for defense in 1978-79, and 16 percent 
of that for 1979-80, the author has projected the R &. D for nuclear weapons, 
expressed in parentheses, to be approximately 17 percent of the total estimated 
89 
The Newport Papers 
R &: D for defense in 1980-81.  or l1.479m. No further .. Other R &: D" data are 
available to date. 
For the statistical correlation between the strategic nuclear deterrent and the 
other variables treated here. see Table 2 and the accompanying data analysis. 
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Dissimulation as Stratecraft 
Analysis of British Defense Expenditures 
Utilizing Least Squares F8tim.ation 
by Cochrane-Orcutt Type Procedure 
Dependent Variable = Strategic Nuclear Deterrent 
Variable name 
Defense Spending as a 










0. 1 7353 
-302.25 
*Statistical significance = 10 or higher 
See analysis of data in Table 2 on page 92. 
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Table 2 
Data Analysis 
As indicated in Table 2, multiple regression analysis with correlated distur­
bances was performed using the Cochrane-Orcutt Type Procedure. The data 
analysis did not reveal any linear growth in the strategic nuclear deterrent forces 
of the United Kingdom. Rather, that growth has been cyclical over the period 
examined. with the strategic deterrent being a principal beneficiary of the 
expansion in defense spending as a percentage of GNP. 
A multiple regression analysis was performed in order to determine which 
variables or elements in British budgets, over time, corre1ated with the strategic 
nuclear deterrent in a statistically significant way. For this purpose, therefore, the 
strategic nuclear deterrent was held to be the dependent variable. The independent 
variables examined in some fifteen observations were: Defence spending as a percent­
age of GNP, Research and Development, "Other Research and Development" 
Findings 
The principal fmdings were quite revealing, for they demonstrated that 
dissimulation was not applied to "prestige" alone as a justification for posses­
sion of the deterrent, but to the budgetary data as well. Thus, the research and 
development allocation, taken as an independent variable, was not found to be 
significantly correlated with the strategic nuclear deterrent Hence, research and 
development data must be considered statistically irrelevant in terms of any 
correlative relation to the growth of the strategic nuclear deterrent 
Similarly, "Other Research and Development," when held to be an inde­
pendent variable, was not significantly correlated with the strategic nuclear 
deterrent Therefore, "Other R &. 0" ought to be considered a null variable, 
statistically irrelevant British attempts to insinuate "Other R &. 0" along an 
audit track for allocation to the strategic nuclear deterrent, notwithstanding the 
statistical irrelevance of such a correlation, merely confirms in a rather deftni­
tive way that the process of dissimulation continues as statecraft. 
It should be noted that Defence spending, taken as a percentage of GNP, was 
found to be significantly correlated with the strategic nuclear deterrent. Defence 
spending as a percentage of GNP appears to capture both GNP data and defence 
expenditure data as components. In any event, the statistical relationship with 
the strategic nuclear deterrent was found to be both significant and positive for 
Defence spending as a percentage of GNP. 
A more complete data analysis is available upon request from the writer. 
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